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Designing Regulation for Mobile Financial
Markets
Ilya Beylin*
Prior scholarship advocates for international harmonization of financial regulation as
a solution to the problem of cross-border regulatory arbitrage. The scholarship is theoretical
and rests on the contention that financial institutions can simply depart from an unfavorable
regulatory regime. This Paper contributes an empirical foundation to the concern that financial
institutions relocate following regulation, while also deeply qualifying claims that effective
regulation requires international harmonization.
Using experience from swap markets following the Dodd-Frank Act, this Article
provides the first empirical evidence that financial institutions migrate in response to
derivatives regulation. This Article shows that U.S. banks substantially shifted inter-bank
swap trading offshore while the delivery of swaps to U.S. customers did not decline.
Building on this case study, the Article develops theory for what policy goals are more
susceptible to subversion through migration. Policy goals concerned with regulating
relationships between financial institutions and their customers (e.g., goals of customer
protection) are less vulnerable to relocation than policy goals concerned with inter-relationships
between financial institutions (e.g., reduction of systemic risk). This distinction reflects
well-informed priors on the relative costs and benefits of cross-border arbitrage to providers of
financial services and their customers.
In exploring how relocation skirted some regulations and alternative regulatory designs
for achieving the same policy goals, the Article solves a longstanding puzzle for international
regulation. The claim that financial institutions can avoid territorially bounded regulation
appears, on its face, suspect. If an institution truly removes its operations, what legitimate
interest does a jurisdiction retain in regulating that institution? Through examining how
operations may be restructured across borders, the Article shows that a lack of
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harmonization: (a) does not affect whether a jurisdiction can unilaterally implement its policy
goals, but (b) does narrow the range of regulatory designs available to achieve policy goals.
Absent harmonization, jurisdictions may be limited to regulatory designs that are more
difficult to implement, for instance, due to politics, administrative costs or other frictions
affecting efficacious lawmaking, supervision, or enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
A combination of sovereignty and mobility implies that private parties will be
able to select between legal regimes.1 Where jurisdictions differ in how they regulate
an activity, migration allows private parties to avoid regulation.2 Following the
financial crisis, nations have sought to harmonize regulation of their financial
institutions. A key premise to calls for international financial regulation has been
the assertion that the mobility of financial institutions can undermine policy goals

1. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
2. See, e.g., Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2000) (“Individuals and firms who have an incentive to minimize their
transaction and information costs and an ability to choose legal regimes that accomplish this goal over
time may cause the law to move toward efficiency, if only because inefficient regimes end up governing
fewer and fewer people and transactions.”); Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2008) (proposing to measure value of laws through their impact on housing
prices and wages).

Second to Printer_Beylin (Do Not Delete)

500

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

2/26/2020 10:56 AM

[Vol. 10:497

carried out unilaterally.3 Proponents of this view frequently refer to jurisdictional
selection as regulatory arbitrage.4 This Article both supports and challenges the
conventional view, observing that financial institutions have undermined the current
regime through relocation while explaining how the risks from offshore activity
could be reduced through redesign of U.S. regulation.
Scholars have theorized that jurisdictional selection occurs in response to a
variety of legal regimes, including financial regulation.5 Scholars have also
empirically studied jurisdictional selection in tax,6 corporate governance,7 and
securities law.8 This Article is the first to empirically study jurisdictional selection in
3. See William Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2019); ERIC A. POSNER,
LAST RESORT: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF BAILOUTS (2018); Yuliya Guseva, The
SEC and Foreign Private Issuers: A Path to Optimal Public Enforcement, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2055 (2018);
Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843,
845 (2016); John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1270 (2014); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International
Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1437 (2013); Chis Brummer, How International Financial Law
Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 267 (2011); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89
TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010); Yesha Yadav, Specter of Sisyphus: Re-Making International Financial Regulation
after the Global Financial Crisis, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 83, 85–86 (2010); Jonathan Rodden & Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1521 (1997); Frank Partnoy, Financial
Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997).
4. See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373,
435–36 (D.D.C. 2014) [hereinafter SIFMA v. CFTC].
5. Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional
Competition on Regulatory Standards, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 52 (2016) (reviewing literature).
6. Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101
VA. L. REV. 1649 (2015); Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International
Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (2008).
7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1441 (1992); Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280–081 (1985); Ralph
K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251 (1977); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
8. Scholarship in securities regulation supports that jurisdictional competition may create a race
to the top. Starting with John Coffee, legal scholars have argued that some foreign firms list in the
United States to “bond” themselves to heightened disclosure and liability standards. John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999). Bonding allows foreign firms with high-quality governance
that exceeds minimum standards applicable in its home jurisdiction to credibly signal and commit to
maintaining that heightened standard of governance. Empirical assessments of the bonding hypothesis
have generally found supporting evidence. René M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost
of Capital, 12 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, (Columbia Law
School Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 205, 2002); William A. Reese, Jr.
& Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States,
and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2002) (obtaining empirical results supporting the
bonding hypothesis); Craig Doidge, U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from
Dual Class Firms, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 519, (2004) (obtaining empirical results supporting the bonding
hypothesis); Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & René M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the
U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (2004) (obtaining empirical results supporting the bonding
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response to derivatives regulation and provides strong evidence that financial
institutions massively relocated operations following regulation.9 This evidence
substantiates that unilateral regulation may be ineffectual due to the mobility of
financial institutions.10 However, this Paper also identifies that the ability of

hypothesis); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 230, 284–4292 (2007) (reviewing evidence of the bonding hypothesis); C. Fritz Foley,
Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Jonathan Greenstein & Eric Zwick, Opting Out of Good Governance, 46
J. EMP. FIN. 93 (2018); Leyuan You, Janet D. Payne & Steve Wen-Jen Lin, Do Multiple Foreign Listings
Create Value for Firms?, 69 Q. REV. ECON. FIN. 134 (2018). Across scholarship looking at government
response to private responsiveness, conclusions differ on whether there is a race-to-the-top, a
race-to-the-bottom, or simply meandering among jurisdictions in these areas. Carruthers & Lamoreaux,
supra note 5 (surveying a broad set of academic studies and finding that “dire predictions of those who
assert that more stringent regulation of business will produce divestment and flight have seldom been
realized in practice”); see Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover
Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629, 632 (2016) (finding inter-state variations on some anti-takeover
statutory provisions having little impact on firm performance contrary to prior findings); Stephen
J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1997) (building on the “law as product” model to argue that issuers
should be able to select the jurisdiction whose regime governs their securities issuances, thus enabling
jurisdictions to create specialized regimes and issuers to sort between them). See generally Edward
J. Kane, Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking
Regulation, 36 J. FIN. 355 (1981) (explaining how through private adaptation and re-regulation, markets
and the government engage in a Hegelian dialectic moving society through “an endless series of
conflicts between economic and political power”).
9. This Article does not take a strong position on whether U.S. banks’ migration of swap activity
to foreign subsidiaries is undesirable. As other scholars have observed, jurisdictional selection in
response to regulatory change can be desirable or not depending on the quality of those regulations.
Fleischer, supra note 3, at 234 (2010) (“Whether a particular regulatory arbitrage technique is good or
bad necessarily depends on a prior question of whether a particular regulation enhances social
welfare.”). Whether swap regulations adopted under the Dodd Frank Act are on net socially desirable
is a subject beyond the scope of this Article. Other scholars have described those regulations as
desirable—and from this point of view, the flight of swap activity observed in this Article represents
undesirable regulatory arbitrage. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1270; Verdier, supra note 3, at 1445
(reviewing the theory that “some countries have incentives to maintain inefficiently low standards [of
financial regulation] because the costs are borne by others”); SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 431
(referring to “immeasurable” benefits of preventing future financial crises). Irrespective of whether the
regulations embody socially desirable policy, adaptation to regulation creates deadweight loss. Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 221, 221 (1990)
(“The literature on optimal taxation considers how revenue can be raised in a manner that minimizes
the distortion of behavior.”). See generally Dhammika Dharmapala, THE ECONOMICS OF TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (2017).
10. For background on the architecture of international financial regulation, see Chris
Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(2012); DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION (2008); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see also JACK
L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Edward F. Greene
& Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1083 (2012); Chris Brummer, Territoriality As a Regulatory Technique: Notes from the
Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 515 (2011) (arguing that globalization has undermined
regulatory capacities); Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243 (2010); Douglas
W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening
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financial institutions to subvert policy goals through relocation depends also on the
regulatory objective in question and the regulatory devices used to achieve it. Based
on observation of financial services mobility and refinement to the conventional
theory of regulatory arbitrage, this Paper identifies policy goals more and less likely
to be subverted through migration and proposes means for more effective
unilateral regulation.
Swap market reform following the financial crisis serves as the setting for this
case study of the vulnerability of regulation to relocation. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”)
initiated comprehensive regulation of the swaps market. Regulations adopted under
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act not only impose substantial obligations11 on swap
market participants but also provide public data on all U.S. swap transactions.
Although regulation of swaps markets under the Dodd-Frank Act was based on an
international framework, the United States has in some key areas gone beyond the
European Union and other jurisdictions in restricting swap activity.12 Since data on
outstanding swaps became available in late 2013, the U.S. swaps market imploded.13
As shown in Figure I.A, the volume of interest rate swap transactions14 has declined
by over a third15 since data became available:
the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 488 (2009); Joel
P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34
HARV. INT’L L.J. 47 (1993).
11. See infra Part I.
12. Members of the Group of 20 nations (“G-20”) endorsed a multi-dimensional regulatory
framework for over the counter (“OTC”) derivatives markets. FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES
REFORMS PROGRESS: REPORT FROM THE FSB CHAIRMAN FOR THE G20 LEADERS’ SUMMIT 1 (2013).
Notwithstanding general commitments to a shared framework, members of the G-20 have
implemented varying regimes. This Article does not purport to identify all the material discrepancies
across G-20 regimes. See also infra notes 23 and 60 and surrounding text (discussing material differences
in pre-trade regulation). Although perhaps of limited social import, from a scholarly perspective, the
European Union’s relative lack of publicly reported granular data on swap transactions is another
noticeable gap between the regimes.
13. As discussed further throughout this Article, notional amounts are used to track changes in
levels of swap activity. This is a standard within the industry, and U.S. and foreign regulators follow
swap market activity based on outstanding notional amounts. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES 13
(2017 Q1) (explaining “[c]hanges in notional amounts are generally reasonable reflections of business
activity and can provide insight into potential revenue and operational issues”).
14. The empirical results of this paper are based on the interest rate swap market, which is the
largest swap market. Generally speaking, the same regulatory scheme applies to interest rate swaps,
foreign currency swaps, equity swaps, credit default swaps, energy, metal, agricultural, weather, health,
and other swaps. As discussed below, the Securities and Exchange Commission authored many of the
rules governing the small fraction of swaps based on a single company’s performance or the
performance of a small number of companies (including single name credit default swaps). See Stephen
J. Lubben & Rajesh P. Narayanan, CDS and the Resolution of Financial Distress, 24 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 129, 131 (2012) (discussing single name credit default swap market).
15. For ease of review, CFTC data is smoothed based on a four-week running window and
presented in trillions of U.S. dollars. Except where specified otherwise, the CFTC data is on
fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps across all currencies.
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Figure I.A: U.S. Swap Market Activity
As is the case with many other industries, swaps are provided through a
combination of two markets—a market between providers and consumers, and a
wholesale market serving providers. This Paper exploits data on three distinct
market segments to identify an exodus of swap activity offshore. Comprehensive
data on U.S. swap market activity from the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) shows that customer usage of swaps has only increased
subsequent to regulation.16 In contrast, CFTC data on U.S. wholesale markets
shows a decline of nearly fifty percent. This contrast creates a puzzle, how could
the consumption of a product increase while the wholesale markets enabling the
delivery of that product massively decline? Data from the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) on the worldwide interest rate swap activity of U.S. banks
and their subsidiaries unlocks that puzzle.17 While wholesale swap markets in the
United States have imploded, the global participation of U.S. banks in wholesale
markets remains constant. Financial institutions continue to provide U.S. customers
with swaps to the same or greater extent as they have prior to the implementation
of regulations, while they have moved inter-bank wholesale swap activity offshore.

16. CFTC data is taken from the weekly swaps report available here: https://www.cftc.gov/
MarketReports/SwapsReports/Archive/index.htm [ https://perma.cc/L85Y-4W5Y ] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2019 ).
17. OCC data is taken from what is now Graph 11 in the Quarterly Reports on Bank Trading
and Derivatives Activities. An archive of the reports is available here: https://www.occ.gov/topics/
capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html [ https://perma.cc/
RGX4-FQ46 ] (last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ). Except where otherwise specified, the OCC data is on all
interest rate contracts across all currencies.
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These trends strongly support that the industry providing swaps reorganized in a
manner that decreases the regulatory burdens of the Dodd-Frank Act.18
The swap market experience enables testing and refinement of theory for
when international harmonization is necessary for achieving policy objectives.
Goals of customer protection, or more broadly the regulation of markets between
financial services providers and their customers, are relatively immune to regulatory
arbitrage through relocation. Although prior work has looked at the mobility of
financial institutions as the constraint on unilateral regulation, the mobility of
financial institutions alone is insufficient to avoid regulatory objectives governing
provision of financial services. Under conventional territorial norms, regulatory
obligations attach not only based on the location of the service provider but also
the location of the customer. These norms are reflected in the international reach
of U.S. financial regulations generally and in the reach of swap market regulations
specifically. As a result, it is insufficient for a financial institution to relocate for its
services to escape regulatory ambit. The customer must also relocate operations to
enable avoidance. The swap market experience supports that customers generally
do not relocate. The balance of benefits and costs to relocation tends to make
migration unattractive for customers, particularly where the regulation has customer
protection as an objective and is competently designed and implemented. As a
result, markets between financial institutions and their customers are relatively
immune to regulatory arbitrage through relocation. This Paper develops a
framework for understanding why customers generally do not collude with financial
services providers in reducing regulatory burdens and when they may do so. In
contrast, markets between financial services providers are more mobile based on
the empirical observations and theory developed in this Paper. International
harmonization may substantially further objectives relating to intra-financial
institution markets such as the containment of systemic risk.
This Article not only identifies the migration of systemic risk beyond the
ambit of U.S. regulations but also explains ways the United States may unilaterally
address this threat. The exodus of swap trading to less-regulated offshore
subsidiaries need not threaten the health of the U.S. financial system. Instead of
preventing activities that increase risk at the foreign subsidiary level, domestic
regulators can stem the flow of risk from foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parents.
Yet, adopting these protections requires both coordination between governmental
bodies and discipline not to abandon them during market distress. Effective
unilateral regulation to prevent the influx of systemic risk from foreign subsidiaries
requires cooperation between the CFTC, SEC, and banking regulators that has yet

18. Ian Acker, Strength in Transparency: Migrating Systemic Risk Through Harmonization of
Reporting Requirements for OTC Derivatives, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L. REV. 947, 962–63 (2017) (discussing
regulatory arbitrage); John Welling, In Defense of the Dealers: Why the SEC Should Allow Substituted
Compliance with the European Union for Security-Based Swap Dealers, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 927
(2016) (discussing regulatory arbitrage); Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial
Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 861, 915 (2016) (discussing inter-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage).
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to manifest. Moreover, ex ante prevention of risk accumulation may be more
effective than its ex post containment through installing regulatory sandbags
between U.S. banking entities and their foreign subsidiaries.
Seen in light of alternatives for achieving regulatory priorities on a unilateral
basis, international harmonization becomes a helpful means to regulation rather
than a necessary predicate. International harmonization eases the difficult problems
of regulatory design created when regulated domestic activity interacts with
unregulated (or differently regulated) foreign activity. International harmonization
may be especially desirable where institutional problems impair unilateral
lawmaking, such as the challenges of coordination between independent financial
agencies (and Congressional committees). But international harmonization is
generally not strictly necessary for preventing private mobility from undermining a
range of policy goals. Scholarship concerned with regulatory arbitrage through
relocation not only exaggerates its threat to policymaking but fails to acknowledge
cases in which the threat evolves from a combination of private re-ordering and
public bodies’ failure in designing or implementing unilateral regulations.19
This view also resolves an ostensible paradox in the traditional criticisms of
regulatory avoidance through relocation. The conventional view is that financial
service providers can undermine regulatory priorities through relocation. Yet, if the
lawmaker does not err20 towards an unrealistically narrow definition of location,
relocation not only exempts financial activity from regulation but also vitiates the
regulatory interests in the activity as its locus and consequences on counterparties
no longer touch the relevant jurisdiction.21 On first pass, relocation changes the
substance of activity in a manner that should be respected in an international order
built on territorial deference. Relocation can, nevertheless, pose a challenge to
regulation—even modest regulation that does not have extraterritorial aspiration.
As introduced above and explored in this Article, lack of harmonization limits the
scope of tools available for achieving national priorities. As one example, prior to
19. A more troubling motive for encouraging other jurisdictions to conform to domestic
regulation is the political interest of jurisdictions in retaining their financial firms rather than see them
move abroad. Exploring the protectionist undertones of the calls for harmonization, as well as the
legitimate policy interests in minimizing social losses due directly to relocation (i.e., deadweight loss),
are left for further work.
20. If the lawmaker does err in adopting an overly narrow definition, “exploitation” of the
definition should be expected, and it is easy to sympathize with the lawyer providing guidance on how
to accurately albeit conveniently construe the provision. Naturally, language may be purposefully or
inadvertently ambiguous (and while those two cases are significantly different, they oftentimes cannot
be distinguished in the context of multi-member institutions such as Congress). For purposes of this
discussion, exploitation of inadvertent ambiguity in the geographic scope of regulatory regimes is
neglected.
21. It is worth repeating that financial services are just that, services, and thus flow under
contracts between identifiable parties. Thus, the direct consequences of financial services are largely
isolated to the financial service provider and recipient, as opposed to, for example, environmental
concerns such as pollution where weather patterns or currents can lead to harms beyond the
jurisdictions of parties involved in the commercial transactions.
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Dodd-Frank, concerns arose that swap dealers were charging customers higher
prices than dealers were charging each other. This was seen as a potential
manifestation of anti-competitive behavior. Rather than rely on traditional antitrust
tools, Congress imposed a requirement that dealers trade on open, multi-lateral
platforms where dealers would not control whether the price they offered was taken
by another dealer or a customer.22 This was a creative, market-based method for
addressing a potential antitrust problem. Through relocation to the United
Kingdom and other jurisdictions that did not impose the platform execution
requirement, dealers were able to skirt this novel remedy to concerns with
oligopolistic prices.23 This is just one example of how relocation may subvert means
of achieving regulatory priorities, leaving states with more limited arsenals to
accomplish policy goals.
Through detailed attention to market structure, regulation, and data on
financial activity, this Paper supports and elaborates conventional theory on the
limitations of unilateral financial regulation. Part I of this Article provides an
introduction to swaps, the markets in which they trade, and their regulation under
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. Part II of this Article presents the trends on which
the findings of massive migration in the wholesale market are based on. Part III
considers the implications of the swap market experience for unilateral regulatory
efforts. A brief conclusion follows.
I. SWAP TRANSACTIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF SWAP MARKETS
Swaps are the dominant form of derivatives contracts used by parties to
exchange risk in financial markets. This Part introduces the swap instrument,
explains how swaps are used and traded, and then covers the extensive regulation
of swap markets pursuant to rules promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act.
A. What Is a Swap?
The term “swap” has ambiguous contours but some definite and frequently
encountered instantiations. A practical definition of “swap” can take the following
form: “a bilateral agreement to exchange future cash flows based on some agreed
formula.”24 An example is a floating-for-fixed interest rate swap, which calls for (a)
payments by one party based on the product of a floating interest rate and a fixed
22. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
T RADING C OMM ’ N (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
berkovitzstatement110518a [ https://perma.cc/N88T-KJG3 ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
23. MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CFTC AND EU MIFID II/MIFIR
DERIVATIVES TRADING AND TRANSPARENCY REGIMES AND MFA RECOMMENDATIONS TO
FACILITATE COMPARABILITY / EQUIVALENCE 2 (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.managedfunds.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MFA-Comparative-Analysis-of-SEF-Regime-vs-EU-MiFIDII-MiFIR-Derivatives-Final.pdf. [ https://perma.cc/XLL4-GHSG ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
24. Lawrence C. Tondel, Introduction to Derivatives, in DERIVATIVES: LEGAL PRACTICE AND
STRATEGIES § 1.01[B][3], 1-1, 1-9 (Robert D. Aicher ed., Supp. 2011).
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amount, called the notional, in exchange for (b) payments by the counterparty based
on the product of a fixed interest rate and the same notional amount. This example
illustrates the origins of the name “swap” because the instrument allows the parties
to swap payment obligations based on two interest rates—a floating rate and a fixed
rate. The example of an interest rate swap is particularly useful to illuminating swap
markets because the great majority of the global swap market consists of interest
rate swaps.25 Swaps can be used to provide contingent payments based on a variety
of events, ranging from changes in financial indices such as inflation, currency, and
interest rates, to changes in prices of tangible commodities such as energy, metals
and foodstuffs, to manifestations of tangible risks such as weather events and
longevity trends.26 Another example of a swap is a natural gas swap, which may
require (a) payments by one party based on the product of the market price per unit
of natural gas in a particular region and a notional amount representing units of
natural gas, in exchange for (b) payments by the counterparty based on the product
of a fixed per-unit price of natural gas and the notional amount.
B. How Are Swaps Used and How Are They Traded?
Having offered some definitional background on swaps, it is helpful to discuss
how swap transactions are used and the markets in which swaps trade.27 First,
consider the case of a hedging natural gas producer, Party A. Party A has financed
itself with floating rate bonds. To hedge risk on its floating rate bonds, Party A has
entered into a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap with a large bank, Party B. Given
volatility in energy markets, Party A has also hedged its exposure to the price of
natural gas by entering into a floating-for-fixed swap based on an index of current
natural gas prices. As a result of its natural gas production, bond issuance and the
two swap trades, Party A would (a) receive payments for its natural gas that floated
with market rates, (b) trade those floating rate payments for fixed amounts due
under the natural gas swap, (c) use fixed amounts received under the natural gas
swap to satisfy its fixed payment obligations under the interest rate swap, and (d)
use the floating amounts received under the interest rate swap to make interest
payments due under the bonds. Through the two swap transactions, Party A has
locked in steady cash flows for its employees, vendors, investors and other
stakeholders. De-risking in this stylized manner is a powerfully attractive

25. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT
END-JUNE 2016 (2016) (“The interest rate segment continues to account for the vast majority of
outstanding OTC derivatives. At end-June 2016, the notional amount of outstanding OTC interest rate
derivatives contracts totaled $438 trillion, which represented 80% of the global OTC derivatives
market.”).
26. Kai Kaufhold, How to Price Longevity Swaps, 77 REINSURANCE NEWS 18 (2013).
27. See Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the Regulatory State, 21
J. CORP. L. 69, 72 (1995) (“Derivatives are a means to risk management . . . . At best, the use of
derivative instruments permits parties in financial transactions to shift the risks associated with such
transactions to the parties that have the comparative advantage in bearing the risk.”).
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proposition that derivatives markets are able to offer to businesses and explains a
key role of derivatives in the real economy.
In addition to hedging, derivatives may be used to speculate.28 Given a view
as to future market movements, derivatives may be used to express that view. For
example, consider a hedge fund that expects the price of natural gas to go up. To
express that view (i.e., to go long on natural gas), the hedge fund could enter into a
fixed-for-floating swap under which it pays a fixed rate to receive the market price
of natural gas.29 Similarly, a hedge fund that expected interest rates to go down could
express that view (i.e., go short interest rates) by entering into a floating-for-fixed
interest rate swap under which it pays a floating interest rate to receive a fixed rate.30
The preceding examples of the hedging natural gas producer and the
speculating hedge fund provide an introduction to how swaps are used.31 However,
the discussion leaves an important question unaddressed, namely, how do firms
enter into swaps, or in other words, who supplies swaps to meet market participants’
demand for swaps?32
When a party wants to enter into a loan to buy a house, the party typically goes
to a bank or another mortgage originator. Similarly, when a party desires to enter
into a swap, the party goes to one of a handful of large financial institutions that
serve as “swap dealers.”33 In the example above, Party B is a swap dealer.34 Swap

28. Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (arguing that the legalization of speculative over-the-counter
derivatives trading under the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 led to the financial
crisis); Timothy E. Lynch, Coming Up Short: The United States’ Second-Best Strategies for Corralling
Purely Speculative Derivatives, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 545, 549 (2014) (arguing that purely speculating
trades have negative externalities, destroy wealth, and are irrational). This Article uses speculation to
refer to activity that is designed to profit either from market correction (i.e., arbitrage) or market
growth (i.e., investment).
29. Payments would be based on a notional amount, so the fixed payment made by the hedge
fund would be based on the product of a fixed rate per unit of natural gas and the notional amount of
natural gas. Similarly, the floating amount due to the hedge fund would be based on the market rate per
unit of natural gas multiplied by the notional amount of natural gas.
30. As with the natural gas speculator, payments are based on the notional amount of the
interest rate swap. The floating amount due from the hedge fund would be the product of the floating
rate and the notional amount. Conversely, the fixed amount due to the hedge fund would be the
product of the market rate (e.g., three-month US LIBOR) and the notional amount.
31. See Stephen J. Lubben, Subsidizing Liquidity or Subsidizing Markets? Safe Harbors,
Derivatives, and Finance, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 463 (2017) (discussing how swaps may be used to hedge
or speculate).
32. For a succinct overview of the structure of derivatives markets, see MARK JICKLING
& KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41398, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII, DERIVATIVES 1–5 (2010).
33. OCC, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING & DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND
QUARTER (2017) (“The four banks with the most derivative activity hold 89.6 percent of all derivatives,
while the largest 25 banks account for nearly 100 percent of all contracts.”)
34. As of the time this Article was being written, there were approximately 100 registered swap
dealers as reflected in the registry of swap dealers maintained by the National Futures Association.
SD/MSP Registry, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/
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dealers serve as sources of liquidity to swap market participants, standing ready to
meet demand from firms hedging, speculating or otherwise transacting in swaps.35
Thus the natural gas producer36 would likely reach out to one or more swap
dealers—directly or through a broker—with a request to provide pricing for a
natural gas swap that could, in part or whole, hedge its expected production of
natural gas. The swap dealer would estimate the cost it would incur to hedge that
natural gas swap or maintain the risk of that swap on its balance sheet (referred to
as “warehousing” the risk). Then, the dealer would respond with a price that
represented its cost and a premium for profit.37 Assuming the transaction was
executed, the swap dealer could then enter into an offsetting swap with another
swap dealer that had itself acquired a short position, such as through transacting
with the fund that was discussed above.38

membership-and-directories.html#sdregistry [https://perma.cc/S3ET-G2P7] (last visited July 30,
2018).
35. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(47) (2018); see also Further Definition of “Swap
Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap
Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,598 99 (May 23, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240).
36. The natural gas producer in the preceding example may be referred to as a natural long for
natural gas and a natural short for interest rates. That is because, vis-à-vis prices of natural gas, the
firm’s role as producer of natural gas gives it a long position in natural gas (i.e., the firm has natural gas
to sell at market prices so that increases in prices redound to its benefit and decreases in prices reduce
the firm’s profits). Similarly, vis-à-vis interest rates, the firm’s role as issuer of floating rate bonds gives
it a short position in interest rates (i.e., the firm’s profits increase as interest rates go down and decrease
as interest rates go up). Conversely, the hedge fund’s speculative strategies can be expressed through a
short position in natural gas and a long position in interest rates. Thus, the fund may be an ideal
counterparty for the natural gas producer; however, in historical swap markets, the natural gas producer
and the fund would rarely, if ever, transact directly. Rather, each of the parties would transact with a
swap dealer.
37. Costs reflect not only the cash flows expected to be due on offsetting transactions but a
premium reflecting the credit risk of the customer. For a discussion of swap market structure including
mechanisms to manage credit risk, see Ilya Beylin, A Reassessment of the Clearing Mandate: How the
Clearing Mandate Affects Swap Trading Behavior and the Consequences for Systemic Risk, 68 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1143, 1173–1189 (2015). Daniel Awrey further develops the description of swap market
infrastructure and mechanisms used to manage counterparty credit risk to contrast pricing in swap
markets with pricing in conventional equity markets. See Daniel Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives
Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104 (2016).
38. Swap dealers may offset risk acquired through a series of customer transactions on a
portfolio basis rather than offsetting risk on a transaction by transaction basis. See Tondel, supra note
24, § 1.01[B][3], at 1–10 (“Often, one party to a swap is a derivatives dealer and the other party is a
so-called ‘end user.’ . . . [A] professional derivatives dealer is generally not in the business of directly
speculating on interest rates (or the future prices of any other underlying assets, indices, or reference
rates). Rather, in the course of conducting its business, the derivatives dealer will generally strive to
maintain a balanced portfolio of derivatives positions (e.g., entering some interest rate swaps where the
dealer is obligated to make payments based on a fixed rate of interest, and others where the dealer’s
payments are based on a floating rate of interest).”).
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Figure II.B: The Customer Serving Market and the inter-Dealer Market
Through sets of similar transactions, swap dealers serve as intermediaries of
risk. Parties desiring to go long or short approach swap dealers seeking to enter into
swap transactions.39 Swap dealers enter into these transactions and then find other
parties (usually other swap dealers) to offload the risk to.40 Through the nexus of
swap dealers, natural longs eventually meet natural shorts, and speculators, such as
funds, provide liquidity to other market participants. Trading between swap-dealers
creates a wholesale market, which enables swap dealers to serve their customers.
Figure II.B above shows the end-user serving market and the wholesale inter-dealer
market involved in the delivery of swaps to customers.41

39. There is some debate regarding the extent to which commercial firms actually engage in
swap contracts to manage their risks. See Wayne Guay & S.P Kothari, How Much Do Firms Hedge with
Derivatives?, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 423 (2003).
40. See Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 77
Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,600 (May 23, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240).
41. The Volcker Rule aims to ensure that large banks only use swap transactions to hedge or
intermediate risk, and do not themselves speculate through swap transactions (or other financial
instruments). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619, 12
U.S.C. § 5301 (2010).

Second to Printer_Beylin (Do Not Delete)

2020]

2/26/2020 10:56 AM

DESIGNING REGULATION

511

C. How Does the Dodd-Frank Act Regulate Swap Markets?
With the preceding background on the uses of swaps and market structure, we
turn to the regulation of swaps. Prior to 2010, swap markets were famously
unregulated.42 Many have argued that the lack of regulation for swap markets
contributed to the financial crisis and broader economic downturn of 2008.43 The
Dodd-Frank Act granted the CFTC authority to regulate the vast majority of swaps
markets, with authority over swaps based on securities44 granted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among other things, Title VII of the
Dodd-Frank Act: (1) imposes central clearing and trade execution requirements on
swaps;45 (2) provides for the registration and comprehensive regulation of swap
dealers; and (3) creates rigorous recordkeeping and real-time reporting regimes
applicable to all swaps.46 These regulations are discussed in turn.
1. Central Clearing and Platform Execution Under the Dodd-Frank Act.
When a transaction is cleared, the transaction is extinguished, and two new
transactions, each identical to the initial transaction, are created. One of the new
transactions is between the first party to the trade and a clearinghouse (i.e., a central
counterparty), and the second transaction is between the clearinghouse and the
second counterparty.47 As a result, parties to a cleared trade pay amounts due under
the trade to the clearinghouse, rather than to one another.48 Irrespective of whether
the clearinghouse receives payment due under a cleared trade from one
counterparty, the clearinghouse must make an identical payment to the other
counterparty. Thus, the clearinghouse insulates counterparties to the initial trade
from each other’s default risk.49 Clearinghouses are subject to extensive regulation

42. See Brooksley Born, Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2011). Although swaps themselves were generally not regulated, banks,
bank holding companies, clearinghouses, and other financial institutions that support and use the swaps
market were subject to significant regulation. In addition, industry associations helped develop
standardization and best practices in the swaps market. Prior to reforms instituted by the Dodd Frank
Act, swaps primarily traded in so-called “over-the-counter” or “OTC” markets. Sean J. Griffith,
Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98
MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2014).
43. See Griffith, supra note 42, at 1304.
44. The SEC regulates swaps referencing a single security or a narrow basket of securities,
so-called “security-based swaps”.
45. Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough,
the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. REG. 601, 609 (2017) (discussing central clearing,
platform execution and trade reporting requirements).
46. Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208,
48,209 (Aug. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 230, 240, 241).
47. For a description contrasting bilateral trades with cleared trades, see Yesha Yadav, The
Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 409 13 (2013).
48. JICKLING & RUANE, supra note 32, at 3 4.
49. See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards A Governance Structure for Derivatives
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across jurisdictions. Clearinghouses mediate trades subject to a number of operating
procedures and financial backstops designed to increase the likelihood that
obligations to the clearinghouse under cleared trades are satisfied.50 Only
“members” of a clearinghouse may clear trades through it, and members are subject
to extensive restrictions under clearinghouse and CFTC rules.
The clearing mandate forms an integral part of the Dodd-Frank Act and
applies to a range of interest rate and broad-based credit default swaps.51 Certain
transactions are eligible for exceptions from the clearing mandate. A prominent
exception from the clearing mandate is made for a non-financial customer that
enters into a swap to mitigate commercial risk (the so called “end-user exception”).52
Additional exceptions have been promulgated for inter-affiliate swap transactions
and certain swaps entered into with cooperatives.53
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the clearing mandate dovetails with another
element of the swaps market reform program.54 As mentioned above, in addition
to clearing standardized derivatives, Dodd-Frank provides that standardized swaps
will be traded on exchanges or electronic platforms. In particular, under section
2(h)(8) of the Commodity Exchange Act, swap transactions that are subject to the
Clearing Houses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1194 95 (2012) (“[T]he institution of clearing, if successful,
effectively eliminates dealers’ counterparty credit risk and, with it, the principal advantage of keeping
the vast majority of derivatives trading among a small group of (supposedly) high-credit, [sic] quality
dealers.”). See also Stephen J. Lubben, Always Crashing in the Same Car—Clearinghouse Rescue in the
United States under Dodd-Frank, 3 J. FIN. REG. 133, 135 (2017) (discussing risks that clearinghouses
take on in insulating transactions from original counterparty failure).
50. CFTC regulated clearinghouses, which are called derivatives clearing organizations, must
satisfy a number of core principles. Commodity Exchange Act § 5b(c)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(1)(c)(2). These
core principles include standards governing the financial resources of the derivatives clearing
organization, standards governing admission and eligibility of its members, risk management standards,
standards governing its own default as well as the default of its clearing members and standards
specifying system safeguards. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 39.1 (2015) (setting forth requirements applicable
to derivatives clearing organizations); Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives
Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 454 56 (2013).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 50.4 (2015). The CFTC has further considered clearing requirements for certain
currency non-deliverable forwards. See Silla Brush, U.S. CFTC Clearing Rules Eyed for Some Currency
Derivatives, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-07/us-clearing-rules-eyed-for-some-currency-derivative-contracts [ https://perma.cc/UW36-AXLE ] ( last
visited Nov. 18, 2019 ); Timothy Massad, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, in
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, SPEECHES & TESTIMONY, Statement of Chairman
Timothy Massad on Expanded Interest Rate Swap Clearing Requirement Determination and
Final Rulemaking (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
massadstatement092816 [ https://perma.cc/F4QW-Y4JG ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
52. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(h)(7), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
53. Clearing Exemption for Swaps Between Certain Affiliated Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,750,
21,783 (Apr. 11, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50); Clearing Exemption for Certain Swaps Entered
into by Cooperatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 52,286, 52,287 (Aug. 22, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50).
54. See Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Saguato, Regulating Financial Market Infrastructures, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 568 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015) (discussing
the role and regulation of trading and post-trading infrastructures in the securities and derivatives
market in the United States and in the European Union).
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clearing mandate must also be executed on a swap execution facility (SEF) or
designated contract market (DCM) if a SEF or DCM has made the swap “available
to trade.”55 As background, SEFs and DCMs are trading platforms that must
register with the CFTC and are regulated by it.56 SEFs and DCMs have made a
range of interest rate and credit default swaps available to trade.57 As a result, many
of the swaps that must be cleared must also be executed on a regulated trading
platform.58 SEFs and DCMs extensively police trading conduct on their platforms.59
The supervisory and enforcement roles played by regulated platforms enhance trade
integrity in the many-to-many markets mediated through SEFs and DCMs. Swap
dealers continue to act as primary liquidity providers to platforms regulated as SEFs
and DCMs, but as discussed below, liquidity has appreciably moved abroad.
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, swap dealers traded with each other through a
small number of closed platforms, frequently referred to as “inter-dealer brokers.”60
It is thought that dealers offered other dealers preferential prices in entering swaps
through these platforms than they offered to non-dealer customers, reflecting
wholesale efficiencies or potentially oligopolistic dynamics.61 The Dodd-Frank Act
attempted to convert these platforms into open access markets to reduce
opportunities for preferential inter-dealer pricing.62 Generally, transactions that
must be executed on a SEF or DCM have to go through a period of public order
55. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(h)(8), 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8) (2012); see Process for a Designated
Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility to Make a Swap Available to Trade, Swap Transaction
Compliance and Implementation Schedule, and Trade Execution Requirement Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,606, 33,606 ( June 4, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 37, 38).
56. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 37 (2019) (setting forth regulations governing swap execution facilities); id.
pt. 38 (setting forth regulations governing designated contract markets).
57. For a list of “made available to trade” swaps that have been submitted, see Swaps Made
Available to Trade Determination, U.S. CFTC, http://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=SwapsMade
AvailableToTradeDetermination [ https://perma.cc/7U5C-FZTY ] (last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
58. Execution of swaps that have been made available to trade on SEFs and DCMs can proceed
via a request for quote system or through an order book. 17 C.F.R. § 37.9 (2019). A request for quote
system involves the initiating party identifying three or more potential counterparties to solicit with a
proposed transaction; the order of the requesting party is exposed to any contra-orders (i.e., potentially
matching orders) that are sitting in the platform’s order book. Core Principles and Other Requirements
for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,476, 33,494–4501 ( June 4, 2013) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 37). The order book refers to platform systems maintaining sets of orders and contra-orders
with price, volume and product information so as to permit automated matching of supply and demand
for products traded through the platform.
59. 17 C.F.R. §§ 37.200, 37.203, 37.206, 37.400, 37.500, 38.150, 38.153, 38.156–6159, 38.250,
38.500, 38.550, 38.600, 38.650, 38.700 (2019).
60.
J. CHRISTOPHER GIANCARLO & BRUCE TUCKMAN, SWAPS REGULATION VERSION
2.0—AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM AND PROPOSALS FOR
NEXT STEPS 43 (2018).
61. See Gregory Scopino, Expanding the Reach of the Commodity Exchange Act’s Antitrust
Considerations, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573 (2016); Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56
B.C. L. REV. 215 (2015). See also Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal,
11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275 (2013); Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential
Facilities”: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557 (2009).
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 37.202(a) (2019).
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book exposure,63 during which any market participant may improve on an offer
initially received by the party seeking to trade. The conversion of inter-dealer
markets into regulated platforms that are open to all qualified traders represents a
move towards greater egalitarianism in swaps markets.64 The relocation of swap
dealers discussed further in this Article, however, has subverted the goal of creating
inclusive markets.65
2. The Regulation of Swap Dealers Under the Dodd-Frank Act.
A significant number of trades continue to take place in one-to-many,
dealer-mediated markets notwithstanding the advent of mandatory clearing and
platform execution. This is partly because not all products are covered by the
mandates and partly because of the exceptions from mandate requirements.
Bespoke and other illiquid instruments may never be covered by the centralized
clearing requirements because clearinghouses would not have adequate data for
modeling risk exposure and collecting collateral.66 An even greater set of swap
transactions is expected to remain outside of the platform execution requirement
because relatively fewer swaps enjoy liquidity at any point in time (e.g., while there
may be substantial liquidity in five year floating-for-fixed interest rate swaps, there
is likely to be little liquidity for the same swap with a term of 3.9 years). The
end-user exception from the clearing and platform-execution requirements means
that non-financial end-users will be able to continue entering into uncleared
transactions directly with dealers of their choice.67 The Dodd-Frank Act imposes a
range of regulatory obligations that increase financial stability and market integrity
in these traditional, one-to-many swap markets.
Several regulations mitigate the credit-risk parties face on swap transactions.
First, those swap dealers that were not already subject to capital requirements are
being subjected to capital adequacy standards.68 These capital requirements help
ensure that swap-dealer counterparties do not default on their swap obligations.
63. See Ilya Beylin, Taxing Fictive Orders: How an Information-Forcing Tax Can Reduce
Manipulation and Distortion in Financial Product Markets, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 97–99 (2017)
(explaining execution of transactions through order books).
64. Cf. Matthew Leising, Swaps Revolution Falling Flat as Brokers Keep Grip on New Market,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 4, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-05/
swaps-revolution-falling-flat-as-brokers-keep-grip-on-new-market [ https://perma.cc/258Y-7W8D ]
( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ). Some have criticized this move as neglecting the distinction between swaps
markets and financial markets for more liquid products, arguing that mandates to provide an
opportunity for price improvement risk information leakage. See GIANCARLO & TUCKMAN, supra note
60, at 43–52.
65. See Kevin S. Haeberle, Discrimination Platforms, 42 J. CORP. L. 809 (2017).
66. See 17 C.F.R. § 39.5(a)(3)(ii) (2019).
67. End-User Exception to the Clearing Requirement for Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,560
( July 19, 2012).
68. As of the writing of this Article, the CFTC has yet to finalize the capital requirements
applicable to swap dealers that are not subject to prudential regulators’ capital standards. See Capital
Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,252 (Dec. 16, 2016).
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Thus, the capital requirements provide a measure of safety to swap dealers’
counterparties. Second, some of swap dealers’ swap transactions that are not cleared
are subject to “margin” requirements.69 These requirements assure that collateral is
available to support payment obligations under swaps.
As collateral securing swaps trade, margin functions to separate the likelihood
that the posting counterparty will satisfy its obligations from the more complex
analysis of the posting counterparty’s overall financial health.70 This is because so
long as the value of collateral is sufficient to satisfy the counterparty’s obligations
under the trade, the first priority security interest in the collateral guarantees
payment of the obligations in full.71 Mandatory collateralization increases the
likelihood that swap market participants collect on obligations owed under swaps.72
Thereby, the margin rules enhance the financial stability of one-to-many
dealer-mediated markets.
In addition to enhancing financial stability of swap markets, regulations
imposed on swap dealers improve market integrity. The CFTC has mandated that
swap dealers follow business conduct standards designed to inform end-users of the
risks they face in entering swap transactions.73 The disclosure regime seeks to reduce
information asymmetries between swap dealers and their counterparties.74 The rules
are buttressed by anti-fraud provisions, which expose swap dealers to private
liability as well as regulatory and criminal sanction.
Disclosure requirements under the rules are extensive. Swap dealers are
required to prepare disclosures for their counterparties that explain material
information concerning the swap to allow the counterparty to assess: (1) the material
risks of the swap, which may include market, credit, liquidity, foreign currency, legal,
69. Margin requirements initially proposed under Title VII were substantially relaxed through
an international harmonization process led by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions. Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732 (April 28, 2011) (initial proposal);
Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 79
Fed. Reg. 59,898 (Oct. 3, 2014) (modified proposal following BCBS and IOSCO recommendations);
Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81
Fed. Reg. 636 ( Jan. 6, 2016) (final rules).
70. In addition to being a source of collateral for obligations ex post, the obligation to post
margin provides an ex ante constraint on a party’s ability to take risky positions. See Margin Requirements
for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 79 Fed. Reg. at 59,901
(“Well-designed margin systems protect both parties to a trade as well as the overall financial system.
They serve both as a check on risk-taking that might exceed a party’s financial capacity and as a resource
that can limit losses when there is a failure by a party to meet its obligations.”).
71. See generally LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 59–64 (3d ed. 2014).
72. Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 723–24 (2002).
73. Gregory A. Scopino, Regulating Fairness: The Dodd Frank Act’s Fair Dealing Requirement
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 93 NEB. L. REV. 31 (2014).
74. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9743 n.125 (Feb. 17, 2012).
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operational, and any other applicable risks; (2) the material characteristics of the
particular swap, which include the material economic terms of the swap, the terms
relating to the operation of the swap, and the rights and obligations of the parties
during the term of the swap; and (3) the material incentives and conflicts of interest
that the swap dealer or major swap participant may have in connection with a
particular swap.75 At the election of end-user counterparties, swap dealers are also
required to prepare a scenario analysis that shows the end-user’s potential exposure
in connection with the swap.76 The external business conduct rules governing swap
dealers permit end-users to consult on the development of scenario analysis, thus
tailoring it to their needs.77 In addition, to help end-users value their swap positions,
the rules require swap dealers to provide end-user counterparties with a daily
mid-market mark of the swap.78 Where the swap is cleared, the swap dealer may
instead provide the end-user with notice that the end-user is entitled to obtain the
mid-market mark from the clearinghouse where the swap was cleared.79
A variety of protections are afforded to end-users obtaining swaps from swap
dealers. Swap dealers are prohibited from engaging in any act, practice, or course of
business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The prohibition broadly
tracks the language in Section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(Advisers Act), which does not require scienter to prove liability.80 Swap dealers are
75. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(a) (2019).
76. Id. § 23.431(b).
77. Id. § 23.431(b)(1).
78. Id. § 23.431(d).
79. In addition to disclosure obligations, swap dealers are subject to record-collecting
requirements. Among other things, swap dealers are required to gather certain information from
counterparties, including their true name and address and principal occupation or business.
Id. § 23.402(c) (2019). Additional information must be gathered about any person guaranteeing the
counterparty’s performance and any person controlling the counterparty. Id. Swap dealers are required
to maintain extensive records of their swap activities. This requirement goes well past information
relating the terms of the trade. It includes all oral and written communications concerning quotes, bids,
and other features of the trade that are made during the solicitation and negotiation phases of the
transaction preceding execution. Id. § 23.202(a)(1) (2019). The terms of the transaction must naturally
be recorded. Id. § 23.202(a)(2). Records of post-trade processing and events must also be maintained.
Id. § 23.202(a)(3). Not only is the scope of information covered by recordkeeping requirements broad,
but the rules anticipate a level of technological sophistication in accessing the information. Records
must be searchable by transaction or counterparty. And where trade negotiations take place orally, the
phone calls must be recorded and annotated to among other things, identify the timing of any
quotations given on the call. Trade-related records that must be kept also include (i) daily valuations of
each swap; (ii) daily current and potential future exposure of each counterparty; (iii) daily initial and
variation margin required; (iv) daily valuations of collateral, with and without haircuts; and (v) a variety
of other swap related information. Id. § 23.202(a). Additionally, swap dealers must maintain detailed
records of cash and forward positions related to swaps. Id. § 23.202(b).
80. See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[S]ection 206(4) uses the more
neutral ‘act, practice, or course or business’ language. This is similar to [Securities Act] section 17(a)(3)’s
‘transaction, practice, or course of business,’ which ‘quite plainly focuses upon the effect of particular
conduct . . . rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible.’ Accordingly, scienter is not
required under section 206(4), and the SEC did not have to prove it in order to establish the appellants’
liability.’’) (internal citations omitted).
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also required to communicate with their counterparties “in a fair and balanced
manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.”81 Swap dealers that
recommend a swap or trading strategy involving swaps to an end-user must
(1) undertake reasonable diligence to understand the potential risks and rewards
associated with the recommendation; and (2) have a reasonable basis to believe that
the recommended swap or trading strategy involving a swap is suitable for the
counterparty.82 Additional protections apply to swap dealers’ counterparties that
qualify as “special entities.”83 For these purposes, “special entities” are defined to
include a variety of federal and state bodies, certain employee benefit plans and
endowments.84 In aggregate, the combination of regulatory requirements has
profoundly reshaped U.S. swap markets.85
81. 17 C.F.R. § 23.433 (2019).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 23.434(a) (2019) (recommendations to counterparties).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 23.410 (2019) (general prohibitions on fraud, manipulation and other abusive
practices); § 23.440 (2019) (requirements for swap dealers acting as advisors to special entities); § 23.450
(2019) (requirements for swap dealers acting as counterparties to special entities); § 23.451(2019)
(certain pay-to-play prohibitions).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 23.401(c) (2019).
85. Daniel Awrey, in writing about the reforms, has criticized the intervention for applying the
securities model of regulation to derivatives. Daniel Awrey, Split Derivatives: Inside the World’s Most
Misunderstood Contract, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 557 (2019) [hereinafter Split Derivatives] (“In the years
leading up to the global financial crisis, derivatives were largely exempt from the application of federal
securities laws. This laissez-faire regulatory treatment arguably reflected the prevailing political climate
more than any consensus around whether derivatives should be regulated as securities. In the wake of
the crisis, however, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have been quick to extend the
reach of securities laws to derivatives markets. As described in Part I.C, this has included the
introduction of trade reporting and disclosure requirements broadly similar to those imposed on
conventional equity and debt securities.”). Split Derivatives draws a distinction between derivatives and
securities based on the heterogeneity of the former and contractual incompleteness and relational
contract mechanisms “distinguish[ing] derivatives from conventional equity and debt securities.” Id. at
554–55. Split Derivatives proceeds to criticize Dodd-Frank Act regulation for failing to adequately apply
prudential safeguards. Id. at 555–60. These criticisms misperceive the function of derivatives and the
scope of swap regulation following the Dodd-Frank Act.
Derivatives like debt and, even more so, equity contracts can and do suffer from incompleteness
and rely on relational mechanisms. Voting rights, fiduciary obligations, and other protections afforded
to many shareholders as well as managerial reputation serve as important examples of extra-contractual
mechanisms protecting equity holders from exploitation of incompleteness. This is especially true in
non-listed equity markets. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2003). Moreover, derivatives markets include
futures and exchange traded options, which are homogenous. Instead, the key difference between
conventional securities like bonds and equity on the one hand, and derivatives, on the other hand, is
their function. Bonds and equity help issuers raise capital so, for example, new companies can begin
operations and older companies can finance projects or pay returns to their investors. Derivatives, in
contrast, are generally not used to obtain capital but rather to manage exposure to risks. See supra Part
I.B. Of course, there are exceptions such as options granted to employees that reduce issuers need for
capital—but the general distinction between securities and derivatives holds and informs the split in
jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC.
Because capital formation is a key interest weighed in the SEC’s rules governing securities, Split
Derivatives correctly identifies that these rules may not be well tailored to swaps. But in criticizing the
expansion of securities laws to govern swaps, Split Derivatives overlooks that the great majority of swaps
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3. The Costs of Dodd-Frank Act Swaps Regulations.
As discussed above, the Dodd-Frank Act fundamentally reshapes swap
markets. The costs of these changes have been significant. As a sample, swap
dealers are estimated to now commit over $1.4 trillion in margin for cleared and
uncleared trades.86 This figure reflects mandatory purchases of liquid, high-grade

are (for this reason, among others) not regulated as securities. See supra note 44 and surrounding text.
Furthermore, well over eight years after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the SEC has not yet
implemented most regulations treating the fraction of swaps within its purview as securities. See
Security-Based Swap Rules Back on Track: SEC Reopens Comment Period for Proposals, SIDLEY AUSTIN
LLP (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/10/back-on-tracksecurities-and-exchange-commission-reopens-comment-period-for-key [ https://perma.cc/K6WTX442 ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ). Those disclosure requirements that are imposed on swap markets
differ markedly from the prospectus and periodic disclosure-based regimes conventionally applied to
securities markets. Compare Split Derivatives, supra at 556 (explaining that “[f]ederal securities
laws . . . [impose] ‘prospectus, event-driven, and continuous disclosure requirements on issuers of
securities.’), with id. at 556 n.79, and surrounding text (explaining Dodd-Frank Act disclosure
requirements that are generally unrelated to the financial state of the swap dealer “issuing” the swap).
The new rules governing swaps do not require dealers to provide extensive disclosure on their financial
state and operations at the time of execution or subsequently. The foregoing is not to suggest that when
the SEC completes its rulemakings governing security-based swaps, there will not be important impacts
on some markets such as single-name CDS or total return swaps on equities.
Split Derivatives also mischaracterizes other Dodd-Frank Act regulations of swap markets.
Among other things, Split Derivatives criticizes the new rules for failing to sufficiently address
prudential concerns. But the criticism proceeds without assessing significant prudential regulations
embedded in Title VII, such capital and margin requirements that reduce credit risk on swap
transactions. Split Derivatives also casts doubt on the SEC’s capacity to implement prudential oversight,
without addressing the history of SEC’s regulation of broker-dealers (instead, focusing on the failed
supervision of “Consolidated Supervised Entities”). Id. at 559. In criticizing the adequacy of prudential
regulation under Title VII, that paper also fails to appreciate the substantial role of banking regulators
in designing capital and margin standards. Compare id. at 559–60 (calling into question the SEC’s and
CFTC’s capacities to achieve prudential policy goals), with Final Rule to Establish Margin and Capital
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities 4–45 (October 10, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2018/10/10/2018-22021/margin-and-capital-requirements-for-covered-swap-entitiesfinal-rule [ https://perma.cc/H6S6-B4ZQ ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ) (“For swap entities that are
prudentially regulated by one of the [banking regulators], sections 731 and 764 of the Dodd-Frank Act
require the [banking agencies] to adopt rules . . . imposing (i) capital requirements, and (ii) initial and
variation margin requirements on [uncleared] swaps”). Inevitably, academic work must simplify and
focus selectively, yet even at a high level, the critique of regulation that Split Derivatives offers disregards
substantial features of Title VII and the markets it regulates.
86. Hayley McDowell, Over $1.4 Trillion in Collateral Posted by Top Swaps Dealers,
GLOBAL CUSTODIAN (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.lch.com/sites/default/files/media/files/
Best%20Practices%20in%20CCP%20Risk%20Management_3.pdf?utm_source=Global%20Custodia
n&utm_medium=Billboard&utm_term=ROS&utm_content=Risk%20Whitepaper&utm_campaign=
Risk%20Whitepaper [ https://perma.cc/X7VJ-LHJ9 ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ); see BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMS., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES (Feb. 2013) (expecting market participants to need an
additional €700 billion in liquid collateral to meet new margin requirements); BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMS., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR
NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES 2 (Sept. 2013) (explaining that clearing imposes costs in
part due to related margin requirements and that the margin requirements imposed on uncleared
transactions have to be even costlier to drive transactions towards clearing).
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assets that have lower returns than alternative investments swap dealers may make.87
Including service costs charged by clearinghouses and their members for clearing a
swap, the costs of a one trillion U.S. dollar interest rate swap position with a
ten-year duration held for two years is over four hundred million U.S. dollars.88
Annual costs of clearing for a market exceeding a hundred trillion in notional
amount to tens of billions of dollars.89 Because these amounts represent the costs
of risk management, which would occur in an unregulated world to some extent,
the measure is an over-estimate of costs. But mandatory clearing certainly comes
with costs, and the costs of entering into uncleared swaps are by regulator design
even higher. In addition, the potential for end-user participation in dealer-to-dealer
markets through SEFs and DCMs risks compromising any profits swap dealers
receive through preferential wholesale rates in the dealer-to-dealer market.
Although collateral costs and erosion of oligopolistic pricing may represent the
greatest private costs motivating relocation, direct compliance costs are also present.
For the fifteen largest swap dealers in the U.S., the costs of building compliance
technology were estimated at approximately $5 billion.90 Lawyers, compliance
professionals, and back-office enhancements represent additional costs.
4. The Cross-border Reach of Swaps Regulations.
The cross-border reach of these new regulations was substantially uncertain
until July of 2013. In July of 2013, the CFTC issued interpretive guidance explaining
conditions under which regulatory obligations would attach to transactions
completed partly or wholly outside of the United States.91 A seventy-five day
transition period delayed the onset of that guidance, so international swap market
participants had until early to mid-October 2013 to conform to the guidance.92
Major trade groups representing the financial industry mounted a challenge to the
cross-border guidance, which they lost in September 2014.93 While the challenge

87. ANDREW AWAD & KEVIN MCPARTLAND, GREENWICH ASSOCIATES, TOTAL COST
ANALYSIS INTEREST-RATE SWAPS VS. FUTURES 13 (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.greenwich.com/
fixed-income-fx-cmds/total-cost-analysis-interest-rate-swaps-vs-futures [ https://perma.cc/5P39P56M ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. CAPGEMENI, IMPACT OF TITLE VII OF THE DODD FRANK ACT 15 (2011). The annual cost
of swap regulation in the European Union was estimated at €15.5 billion. DELOITTE, OTC
DERIVATIVES: THE NEW COST OF TRADING 1 (2014).
91. Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 ( July 26, 2013) [hereinafter “Cross-Border Guidance”].
92. Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78
Fed. Reg. 43,785, 43,793–95 ( July 22, 2013).
93. SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 422–23 (holding the cross-border guidance was a
non-binding policy statement but recognizing that industry participants would nevertheless “see the
writing on the wall” and comply with the guidance to avoid enforcement risk).
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was being heard, swap dealers incurred significant costs in conforming their
international operations to the dictates of Title VII.94
Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act limits the applicability of swap
regulations under Title VII to “those activities [that] have a direct and significant
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States.”95 A
highly politicized process led to the translation of this vague standard into a more
definitive set of rules for market participants to use in determining whether the new
swap regulations apply to their activities.96 In what was criticized as governmental
evasion, the CFTC chose not to use a notice-and-comment process or undertake
cost-benefit analysis in publishing what was termed its cross-border guidance
(alternately known as extraterritorial guidance, by its critics).97 The cross-border
guidance explains who qualifies as a “U.S. person” and the applicability of swap
regulations to U.S. person swap-dealers, non-U.S. person swap-dealers, and
others.98
The applicability of swap regulations is generally determined on an entity
99
level. An entity either is or is not a “U.S. person,” and the applicability of swap

94. Id. at 423, 435.
95. This section also permits the CFTC to promulgate rules preventing the evasion of swap
regulations. See Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 105 (2014) (“Dodd Frank Act applies extraterritorial regulation in a range
of areas.”).
96. Krug, infra note 122, at 1596–698; Schan Duff, The New Financial Stability Regulation, 23
STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 46, 98 (2018) (discussing harmonization of Title VII swap regulation and the
impression that the harmonization process was “viewed as adversarial, and very much not in the spirit
of other international financial regulatory bodies”); SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 420 (“Plaintiffs
counter that the Cross-Border Action’s text and the CFTC’s characterization of the action are a carefully
orchestrated charade intended to insulate the Cross-Border Action from judicial review.”).
97. Krug, infra note 122, at 1598–99 (explaining how the CFTC avoided typical rulemaking
procedures in adopting its cross-border guidance); Ross Pazzol & Adam J. Joines, D.C. Judge Rules in
Favor of CFTC on Cross-Border Application of Dodd Frank Rules, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2014)
available online at https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/d-c-judge-rules-in-favor-of-cftcon-cross-border-application-of-Dodd Frank-rules/ [ https://perma.cc/HL3D-8A3T ] ( last visited on
July 30, 2018 ).
98. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91.
99. The definition of U.S. person includes “(i) any natural person who is a resident of the United
States; (ii) any estate of a decedent who was a resident of the United States at the time of death; (iii) any
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business or other trust, association, joint-stock
company, fund or any form of enterprise similar to any of the foregoing (other than an entity described
in prongs (iv) or (v), below) (a “legal entity”), in each case that is organized or incorporated under the
laws of a state or other jurisdiction in the United States or having its principal place of business in the
United States; (iv) any pension plan for the employees, officers or principals of a legal entity described
in prong (iii), unless the pension plan is primarily for foreign employees of such entity; (v) any trust
governed by the laws of a state or other jurisdiction in the United States, if a court within the United
States is able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust; (vi) any commodity
pool, pooled account, investment fund, or other collective investment vehicle that is not described in
prong (iii) and that is majority-owned by one or more persons described in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or
(v), except any commodity pool, pooled account, investment fund, or other collective investment
vehicle that is publicly offered only to non-U.S. persons and not offered to U.S. persons [sic]; (vii) any
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regulations turns on the involvement of U.S. persons in the relevant activity.
Critically, the definition of U.S. person does not capture subsidiaries of a
U.S. person, even wholly-owned subsidiaries.100 Thus even if a U.S. bank wholly
owns and controls an entity, that subsidiary will be a non-U.S. person if it has its
principal place of business and is organized abroad.101
The entity-level approach prompts difficult line-drawing problems for
applying U.S. regulation to activity between an entity and a
non-U.S. counterparty.102 At one end of the spectrum, a U.S. bank swap dealer
originates, negotiates, executes, and administers a swap from its headquarters or
other U.S. office. At the other end of the spectrum, a U.S. bank organizes a foreign
subsidiary and ensures that all personnel and assets involved in the origination,
legal entity (other than a limited liability company, limited liability partnership or similar entity where
all of the owners of the entity have limited liability) that is directly or indirectly majority-owned by one
or more persons described in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) and in which such person(s) bears unlimited
responsibility for the obligations and liabilities of the legal entity; and (viii) any individual account or
joint account (discretionary or not) where the beneficial owner (or one of the beneficial owners in the
case of a joint account) is a person described in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), or (vii). Cross-Border
Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,316–617. Technically, the definition of U.S. person in the CFTC
guidance is non-exclusive meaning that other entities may qualify as U.S. person notwithstanding that
they do not meet any of the specified criteria. In practice, however, industry participants have relied on
the specified U.S. person definition in the guidance lacking any firmer delineation of who may be a
U.S. person. The CFTC has suggested that a person “seek[ing] guidance as to whether it is a U.S. person
for purposes of applying the Commission swaps regulations promulgated under Title VII” may seek
written advice or guidance from the CFTC under regulation 140.99. Id. at 45,316 n.235. It is
questionable, however, whether it is practicable for industry participants to seek guidance confirming
that every entity that does not meet one of the specified criteria is indeed a non-U.S. person. Subsequent
CFTC rules under Title VII have incorporated the entity based approach, and although the definition
of U.S. person has varied, these variations do not affect the analysis in this Article. See Margin
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border
Application of the Margin Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 34818, 34823 (May 31, 2016) (“The status of a
legal entity as a U.S. person would not generally affect whether a separately incorporated or organized
legal entity in the affiliated corporate group is a U.S. person. Therefore, an affiliate or a subsidiary of a
U.S. person that is organized or incorporated in a non-U.S. jurisdiction would not be deemed a
U.S. person solely by virtue of being affiliated with a U.S. person.”).
100. See SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d, at 422–23. Investment funds are categorized as
U.S. persons based on the identity of the majority of their owners under prong (vi) of the U.S. person
definition. This does not affect the analysis because the swap dealers whose drop in swap notionals
motivates this paper are large banks rather than investment funds. Similarly, entities with a majority of
beneficial owners that are U.S. persons with unlimited liability for the entity (such as partnerships with
U.S. based general partners) are U.S. persons under prong (vii). But this too is irrelevant to the analysis
of this paper because as a practical matter, unlimited liability entities are rarely if ever used by banks to
organize their operations.
101. See id.
102. The intent here is not to criticize the entity based approach, although principled challenges
to that approach are explored below. There is no reason to think that another basis for defining the
reach of Title VII regulations would not have also posed difficult line drawing problems. If anything,
the CFTC’s approach reserved opportunity to re-characterize seemingly non-U.S. persons as
U.S. persons compromising clarity and predictability for the benefit of avoiding regulatory arbitrage
that takes advantage of line-drawing. See id.; Alex Raskolnikov, Probabilistic Compliance, 34 YALE J. ON
REG. 491 (2017).
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negotiation, execution, and administration of the swap are resident in a foreign
jurisdiction. Infinite grays exist between these two poles. A major question arises as
to whether and how to regulate a swap with a foreign entity when it is originated,
negotiated, executed, or administered by a U.S. bank swap dealer from facilities
outside of the United States.103 This question was answered by the CFTC in
providing limited relief to non-U.S. branches of U.S. banks transacting with foreign
persons.104 However, the relief was limited and created an enormous distinction
between the applicability of swap regulations to a foreign subsidiary and a foreign
branch in the context of trading with non-U.S. persons. If a U.S. bank operates
non-U.S. facing swap activities from a non-U.S. branch,105 those activities are
subject to a far wider range of regulations than if the bank segregates them in a
foreign subsidiary.106 Among other requirements, a U.S. bank swap dealer must
103. In a working paper, Michael Greenberger claims that due to banks taking advantage of an
“obscure footnote” in CFTC guidance, swap dealers were able to sidestep swap regulations while
“arranging, negotiating, and executing” swaps in the United States with U.S. bank personnel. This claim
as to the reach of swap regulation is inaccurate and was unfortunately disseminated through media
reports. Jim Zarroli, Big Banks are Once Again Taking Risks with Complex Financial Trades, Report Says ( June
19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621543525/big-banks-are-once-again-taking-riskswith-complex-financial-trades-report-says [https://perma.cc/X3QY-TZWT] (last visited Nov. 18,
2019); see also Claire Boston, Swap Loophole Leaves U.S. Taxpayers on Hook for Trades, BLOOMBERG
(June 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-19/swap-loophole-leaves-u-staxpayers-on-hook-for-trades-report [ https://perma.cc/YDC8-YW53 ] .
104. As background, international branches of banks have a complicated legal status. The CFTC
has explained that a foreign branch of a U.S. person is itself a U.S. person. Cross-Border Guidance,
supra note 91, at 45,315. In the CFTC’s view, a branch does not have a legal identity separate from that
of its principal entity. Id. The CFTC has also observed that branches are neither separately incorporated
nor separately capitalized and, more generally, the rights and obligations of a branch are the rights and
obligations of its principal entity (and vice versa). Id. Leading private practice lawyers in financial
regulation have disagreed with the CFTC’s characterization of bank branches. HLS Forum on Corp.
Governance and Fin. Regulation, Separate Entity Doctrine for U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (April 30, 2012). In particular, law firms have pointed
out the segregation of branch assets from other bank assets during insolvency to support the
quasi-entity status of branches. Id.
105. For purposes of CFTC guidance, a “foreign branch” is a branch of a U.S. bank that is: (i)
subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Regulation K or the FDIC
International Banking Regulation, or otherwise designated as a “foreign branch” by the U.S. bank’s
primary regulator, (ii) maintains accounts independently of the home office and of the accounts of
other foreign branches with the profit or loss accrued at each branch determined as a separate item for
each foreign branch, and (iii) subject to substantive regulation in banking or financing in the jurisdiction
where it is located. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,329.
106. CFTC Guidance provides that a swap will be viewed as entered into with a
non-U.S. branch of a U.S. bank rather than the U.S. bank if: (i) the employees negotiating and agreeing
to the terms of the swap (or, if the swap is executed electronically, managing the execution of the swap),
other than employees with functions that are solely clerical or ministerial, are located in such foreign
branch or in another foreign branch of the U.S. bank; (ii) the foreign branch or another foreign branch
is the office through which the U.S. bank makes and receives payments and deliveries under the swap
on behalf of the foreign branch pursuant to a master netting or similar trading agreement, and the
documentation of the swap specifies that the office for the U.S. bank is such foreign branch; (iii) the
swap is entered into by such foreign branch in its normal course of business; (iv) the swap is treated as
a swap of the foreign branch for tax purposes; and (v) the swap is reflected in the local accounts of the
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meet the following Title VII obligations when trading with a non-U.S. party even if
that trading is conducted out of a non-U.S. branch (none of which would apply if
that trading was done out of a non-U.S. subsidiary):
Clearing;
Platform execution;
Margin requirements for uncleared swaps;
Swap data recordkeeping;
Swap reporting (including large swap trader reporting and real-time
reporting of swap transaction data);
Portfolio reconciliation and compression; and
Trade confirmation.107
Several of these substantial requirements are eligible for “substituted
compliance” if the trade is entered into from a foreign branch of the U.S. swap
dealer. This relief, however, addresses inconsistency between U.S. and foreign
regulations rather than the burden of those regulations.108 For Title VII regulations
to be satisfied through “substituted compliance,” the CFTC must find that
applicable non-U.S. regulations are “comparable with and as comprehensive as the
corollary area(s) of [Title VII] regulatory obligations.”109 In other words, a foreign
branch of a U.S. bank swap dealer may satisfy a Title VII obligation through
complying with foreign law only if the foreign law accomplishes the same regulatory
objectives as the relevant Title VII regulation.110 Foreign branches of U.S. bank
swap dealers are not given relief from the “what” of any Title VII regulations, they
are only given flexibility as to “how” those obligations are satisfied.111
The gap in regulatory treatment of U.S. bank swap dealers and their foreign
subsidiaries creates a powerful incentive for moving swap activity from U.S. swap
dealers into foreign subsidiaries.112 Part I above explained the significant costs
foreign branch. Id. at 45,330.
107. Id. at 45,368–69.
108. Some of the most thorough and seminal treatments of inter-jurisdictional regulatory
consistency and its effects for regulatory arbitrage and competitiveness come from the tax literature.
To analogize to tax scholarship, substituted compliance grants U.S. businesses a credit for compliance
with foreign regulation that can be used to offset the regulatory obligations of U.S. regulation. See Daniel
Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65, 66 (2011) (describing a worldwide
system of U.S. taxation that eliminates double taxation through giving offsetting credit for taxes paid
to foreign jurisdictions as a common model for effective tax administration, and criticizing that model).
109. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,342.
110. Id.
111. The CFTC has made determinations that certain Title VII requirements may be met
through compliance with foreign regulations after detailed examination of those foreign requirements
and findings that they achieve the same regulatory objectives as the relevant Title VII requirements.
See Comparability Determinations for Substituted Compliance Purposes, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/CDSCP/index.htm
[ https://perma.cc/L75J-H236 ] ( last visited Nov. 11, 2019 ).
112. The Dodd Frank Act recognizes the potential race-to-the-bottom in regulatory laxity. To
deter jurisdictions from adapting permissive regimes and to protect the U.S. financial system from those
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compliance with swap regulation poses to swap dealers. And there is ample
anecdotal evidence that industry participants sought to cabin the reach of Title VII
to U.S. shores.113 Previous literature has proposed regulatory arbitrage may lead
firms to relocate activity to minimize regulatory burdens.114 The imposition of Title
VII regulations and comprehensive data on swap market activity reviewed in this
Article provides an opportunity to examine whether regulatory arbitrage in
fact occurs.
II. REGULATORY CHANGES AND THE REDUCTION OF SWAP NOTIONALS
Figure I.A above shows the trend motivating this Article. Since late 2013,
outstanding interest rate swap notional amounts in the United States have declined
by over a third. Although difficult to measure, the value of the interest rate swap
market as of the end of 2017 has been estimated to approach fifteen trillion U.S.
dollars.115 Economists believe the size of the interest rate swap market is
comparable to the size of the U.S. Treasuries market (16 trillion USD), corporate
bond market (12 trillion USD), mortgage market (15 trillion USD), and municipal
securities market (4 trillion USD).116 The apparent scale of the reduction in swap
market activity is staggering. How would one comprehend, for example, the
consequences for everyday American life of a sustained decrease in home financing

jurisdictions, the Dodd Frank Act includes a provision permitting the CFTC or the SEC, in consultation
with the Treasury, to “determine[ ] that the regulation of swaps or security-based swaps markets in a
foreign country undermines the stability of the United States financial system . . . [and to] prohibit an
entity domiciled in the foreign country from participating in the United States in any swap or
security-based swap activities.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 87o), § 715.
113. See SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 396–697.
114. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1278 (referring to burdens from swap regulation as substantial);
Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,”
“Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant”, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596,
30,703 (May 23, 2012) (“For entities that are not on the boundaries of the statutory definitions, but
rather squarely within them or entirely outside of them, these rules will not affect the costs and benefits
that result from their inclusion or exclusion. The latter group of costs and benefits are a consequence
of the statutory definitions prescribed by Congress.”). On the difficulties and potential misuse of
quantifying the costs (and benefits) of financial regulation, see John C. Coates IV, The Volcker Rule as
Structural Law: Implications for Cost-Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law, 10 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 447
(2015); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. S351 (2014). See also Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s
Enforcement Statistics, 10 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2016) (examining inadequacies in SEC reporting of
enforcement results).
115. Rob Daly, CFTC Looks to ‘Right-Size’ Swaps Market, MARKETS MEDIA (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.marketsmedia.com/cftc-right-size-swaps-market/ [ https://perma.cc/JE64-GL2B ]
( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
RICHARD HAYNES, JOHN ROBERTS, RAJIV SHARMA & BRUCE TUCKMAN, INTRODUCING ENNS: A
MEASURE OF THE SIZE OF INTEREST RATE SWAP MARKETS (Jan. 2018), http://www.cftc.gov/
idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_enns0118.pdf [ https://perma.cc/G6
38-PTAE ]. (last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
116. HAYNES ET AL., supra note 115.
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of over thirty-three percent? If the drop in U.S. swap market activity represents a
real economic reduction in swap volumes, a new financial era has invisibly
dawned.117 Figure I.A suggests that corporate risk management policies have
fundamentally changed over the last decade. Is this so? And what could have
prompted the apparent depression in U.S. swap markets? The rest of this Part
explores the impact of swaps regulation on U.S. swaps activity and explains the
decline of swaps activity as a migration of swaps activity from the United States.
It is common to attribute declines in market activity to regulatory burdens.118
The most important and potentially dis-locative swaps regulations under Title VII
of the Dodd-Frank Act took effect at the end of 2012 and throughout 2013.119
Appendix A provides a timeline of when major swaps regulations took effect. Did
the initiation of a comprehensive regulatory regime over the swap market cause a
massive decrease in activity? More broadly, did the new regulations cause an
appreciable impact on the U.S. economy?
Data from several sources is inconsistent with the view that Title VII
materially altered the U.S. economy.120 As explained above, swap dealers
intermediate transactions between customers (i.e. “end-users”) that enter into swaps
to hedge risk or speculate on future movements in asset prices.121 Commonly, risk
from a transaction with an end-user is mediated through a chain of multiple swap

117.
This Article focuses on Title VII, but there may be other regulations under the
Dodd-Frank Act impacting swaps markets such as changes in bank capital rules and other constraints
on leverage affecting dealers. For an exploration of how independent sets of regulations may serve as
complements or substitutes, see Matthew C. Turk, Overlapping Legal Rules in Financial Regulation and
the Administrative State, 54 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
118. See, e.g., Hester Peirce, Dwindling Numbers in the Financial Industry, BROOKINGS (May 15,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dwindling-numbers-in-the-financial-industry/ [ https://
perma.cc/73WS-SATG ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 ); J. Christopher Giancarlo, Acting Chairman,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC: A New Direction Forward (Mar. 15, 2017) (explaining
the goals of project “Keep It Simple Stupid (KISS)” as reducing “excessive regulatory
burdens”), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-20 [ https://
perma.cc/7NE9-JENB ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 ); Daniel Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives
Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1173 (2016); Torsten Ehlers & Egemen Eren, The Changing
Shape of Interest Rate Derivatives Markets, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW (Dec. 2016), https://
www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1612f.htm [https://perma.cc/U8UL-RRXH] ( last visited July 10,
2018 ) (attributing changes in interest rate markets to regulation and monetary policy); ISDA Research
Note, Cross-Border Fragmentation of Global Derivatives: End-Year 2014 Update, ISDA, Apr. 2015,
https://www.isda.org/a/nqiDE/market-fragmentation-final.pdf [ https://perma.cc/SAW5-UZE7 ]
( last visited July 30, 2018 ); Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice, ISDA
DISCUSSION PAPERS SERIES, May 2011; Peirce, supra; Krug, infra note 122, at 1618 n.320 (drawing on
comment letters from industry participants potentially affected by the new regulations, Anita Krug
explains the potential harm from overregulation).
119. As discussed at the end of Part I, CFTC guidance explaining the application of these
regulations to activities outside the United States became effective in the fall of 2013.
120. This Article examines changes in swap activity at a high level, without relying on
discretionary controls to pick up secondary effects. This Article does not rule out that regulation may
have had positive or negative effects of a relatively low magnitude on levels of interest rate swap activity.
121. See supra Part I.B.
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dealers before being offset through one or more transactions with other end-users.
Thus, trades between swap dealers and customers create a “retail” market providing
the last mile of risk shifting service between dealers and their customers, while
intra-dealer markets serve as wholesale pipes for risk between major financial
institutions. CFTC data shows that swaps usage by end-users has appreciably
increased during the period of intense decline in the overall U.S. swaps market.122

Figure III.A: IRS Notional by Market Participant Category
Figure III.A shows that while swap-dealers’ outstanding interest rate swap
notional declined from over 300 trillion USD to just over 150 trillion USD in an
approximately four year period, end-users’ outstanding notional grew from about
64 trillion USD to 75 trillion USD during the same period.123 In other words, there
is no evidence that regulation had first order deleterious effects on swaps usage in
the broader economy.124 Title VII does not appear to have appreciably interfered
with end-users’ swap consumption in the United States. If regulation had
substantially increased the costs of providing swaps and prevailing prices were

122. Cf. Anita K. Krug, Investing and Pretending, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2015) (arguing
that Title VII swap regulations burdened legitimate risk management by end-users).
123. Because it is based on CFTC data, Figure III.A only shows U.S. swaps market activity.
124. It is possible that absent swaps regulation, the growth in end-user swaps usage would be
even higher. That story relies on a factor increasing swap usage among end-users coinciding with the
onset of regulation and offsetting a drop due to that regulation. There is no factor to this author’s
knowledge that could lead to an increase in end-user swap usage at a magnitude similar to the observed
decrease in swap-dealer’s swap usage. The maintenance of swap activity by U.S. banks on a consolidated
basis throughout this period further corroborates that there was no major economic impetus increasing
swaps usage.
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competitive, Economics 101 predicts that those costs would be passed on to
customers and result in lower consumption of swaps.
Figure III.A helps identify the source of the decline in U.S. swaps activity. The
decline is owed to reduced notionals outstanding on contracts between swap
dealers. There are approximately one hundred registered swap dealer entities, most
of which are well-known banks or their affiliates.125 Changes in behavior among
this group of entities explain the observed decline of well over thirty three percent
in U.S. swap activity. While the market between end-users and consumers of swaps
in the U.S. has remained constant or grown, the inter-dealer market in the U.S. has
cratered. The question then shifts from explaining a reduction in U.S. swap markets
to a reduction in wholesale U.S. swap markets. Is it the case that swap dealers truly
trade fewer swaps with one another in the post-Title VII world? Or is there
something else explaining the observed decline in U.S. swaps activity?
OCC data helps answer these questions. The data aggregates quarterly
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) from all U.S. banks
and their subsidiaries on a global basis.126 These banks include many of the largest
interest rate swap dealers in the United States.127 OCC data shows that on a
consolidated basis, interest rate swap activity by U.S. bank swap dealers has not
appreciably declined. The empirical results of this paper turn on a key difference in
the scope of coverage between CFTC and OCC data. Transactions between a
U.S. bank and an offshore counterparty are visible in both CFTC and OCC data,

125. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
DODD-FRANK ACT
P ROVISIONALLY R EGISTERED S WAP D EALERS , https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/
DoddFrankAct/registerswapdealer.html [ https://perma.cc/8L3P-54ZK ] ( last updated Sept. 30,
2019 ). Non-bank participation in dealing interest rate swaps has historically been negligibly low. See
BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS
AT END-JUNE 2017 (Nov. 2, 2017) (explaining that bank regulators participating in the BIS derivatives
survey represent approximately 96% of the over-the-counter interest rate market share). However, at
least one firm has recently emerged as a non-bank provider of interest rate swaps. Interest Rate
Derivatives House of the Year: Citadel Securities, RISK.NET ( Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.risk.net/
awards/2442287/interest-rate-derivatives-house-of-the-year-citadel-securities [ https://perma.cc/
ZZE8-JGQF ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ). An affiliate of an entity “is a person that directly, or
indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common control
with, the person specified,” whereas a subsidiary is a person controlled by the referenced entity. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.405 (2019).
126. Every national bank, state member bank, insured state nonmember bank, and savings
association is required to file Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income as of the close of business
on the last day of each calendar quarter. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION
COUNCIL, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN OFFICES-FFIEC 031 (2018) https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC031
_201803_f.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3AKR-V4G6 ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
127. In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The
holding companies controlling major swap dealers in the U.S. are Bank of America Corp., Barclays
Bank PLC, BNP Paribas, S.A., Citigroup, Inc., Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, the
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., HSBC Bank PLC, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank
of Scotland PLS, and UBS AG. Id. at 441 n.1.
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whereas transactions conducted abroad between an offshore subsidiary of a
U.S. bank and an offshore counterparty are visible only in OCC data.
Figure III.B charts outstanding interest rate swaps notional for U.S. banks on
a consolidated basis, which includes their U.S. and foreign subsidiaries. The chart
uses the last quarter in 2013 as a baseline and presents percentage changes from that
baseline over the next four years.

Figure III.B: Consolidated Interest Rate Swap Activity of U.S. Banks
Figure III.C highlights the discrepancy between U.S. only interest rate swaps
activity by dealers and consolidated swaps activity by U.S. banks.
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Figure III.C: Comparison of Swap Dealer U.S. Activity with Global
U.S. Bank Activity
How could the U.S. activity of swap dealers have declined by over a third (and
closer to a half) while the global interest rate swap activity of U.S. banks and their
subsidiaries have remained constant? There are only two potential answers:
1. The decline is owed to swap-dealers that are not U.S. banks or their
subsidiaries, i.e.: (a) entities unrelated to banks, (b) foreign banks and
their affiliates, or (c) affiliates of U.S. banks that are not U.S. bank
subsidiaries128; or
2. U.S. banks moved swap dealing operations to subsidiaries outside of
the U.S. and beyond CFTC regulation (including reporting
requirements).
It is highly unlikely that the first of these two explanations wholly motivates
the observed trends. As discussed above, consumption of swaps by U.S. customers
has not declined which is inconsistent with a real decline in swap activity by swap
dealers (whether affiliated with U.S. banks or not). Absent the advent of immense
technological or other efficiencies in delivering swaps through the wholesale market
coincident with the onset of regulation, a real reduction in wholesale markets is
unlikely given the sustained activity level in end-user markets.
Moreover, the swap dealing of entities other than U.S. banks and their
subsidiaries cannot plausibly explain the almost fifty percent decline in inter-dealer
volumes. The regions in Figure III.D identify the potential sources of declines in
inter-dealer swap activity.

128.

See supra note 125.
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Figure III.D: Decomposition of Potential Sources of Decline
On a global level, banks and their affiliates provide approximately ninety-six
percent of interest rate swaps.129 This is shown by the relatively small gap between
the larger circle representing all swap dealing and the smaller lighter circle
representing bank affiliated swap dealing in Figure III.D. Thus, the behavior of
entities unrelated to banks can be largely ignored for purposes of the analysis.
Although significant participation in U.S. interest rate swap markets (and
declines therein) may be attributed to non-U.S. banks and their affiliates that
participation likely falls well short of fifty percent (50%). As explained in more detail
below, only swaps between non-U.S. entities fall outside the CFTC reporting
requirements. Available public data shows neither the extent to which foreign swap
dealers trade with other dealers in the U.S. nor the extent to which non-U.S. dealers
discontinued or migrated operations following implementation of Title VII. But the
relocation or discontinuation of these U.S. operations is insufficient to provide a
likely explanation for the magnitude of the drop in swap dealer notional amounts
observed in CFTC data. Aggregate swap dealer notionals declined close to a half in
the relevant period. Non-U.S. bank assets represent at most about a fifth of banking

129. See supra note 125; Li Lin & Jay Surti, Capital Requirements for Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Central Counterparties 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 13/3, 2013) (“Systemically important
banks’ [sic] (SIBs) are dominant players in the [over the counter derivatives] markets.”). Coffee, supra
note 3, at 1284 (referring to banks as the largest swap dealers).
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assets in the United States.130 Although it is likely that a substantial contribution to
the reduction in U.S. swap activity stems from changes in swap dealing by
non-U.S. swap dealers such as Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
HSBC, RBS and UBS, these changes are unlikely to be sufficient to explain the
massive decline in U.S. inter-dealer trading.
U.S. banks and their affiliates explain at least a significant portion of the
observed decline. Typically, holding companies that own a U.S. bank (known as
bank holding companies or BHCs) concentrate the great majority of their assets and
activities within the bank and its subsidiaries.131 This is particularly true for interest
rate swap activity.132 The OCC provides a report comparing derivatives activity
within the bank and its subsidiaries to BHC-wide derivative activity. This report
shows that over sixty percent of the revenues from swap activity are generated in
banks or bank subsidiaries, confirming that the majority of swap dealing takes place
inside banks and their subsidiaries rather than in other parts of the BHC.133 Thus
over ninety-six percent (96%) of U.S. swap dealing takes place from banks or bank
affiliates; assuming bank assets correlate with swap dealing, about eighty percent
(80%) of bank affiliated U.S. swap dealing is from U.S. banks and their affiliates;
and over sixty percent (60%) of swap dealing by U.S. banks and their affiliates is
out of banks and their subsidiaries. In other words, swap dealing by U.S. banks and
their subsidiaries can be expected to account for approximately forty-five percent
(45%) of all U.S. swap dealing. Can an almost fifty percent (50%) drop in
inter-dealer activity be explained by activity of swap dealers outside that forty-five
percent (45%)? It is arithmetically possible, but it is highly statistically improbable
that the activity of U.S. banks and their subsidiaries does not take a substantial role
in that explanation.134 And that activity shows only a minor decline on a
130. FED. RESERVE BD., SHARE DATA FOR THE U.S. OFFICES OF FOREIGN BANKING
O RGANIZATIONS (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/iba/fboshr.htm [ https://
perma.cc/G8FL-ZF27 ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ).
131. Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi & James Vickery, A Structural View of
U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18(2) FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 65, 71 tbl.1 (2012)., https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
58NZ-Z7ZG ] (last visited on July 30, 2018 ).
132. Orlando Fernández, The Dodd Frank Act’s Pushout Rule: Implications for the Derivatives
Market, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW ( Jan. 13, 2011).
133. Compare OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON
BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES (FOURTH QUARTER 2017) at 4, tbl. 1 (reporting
$4.034 billion in national revenues from interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives at the bank and
bank subsidiary level) [hereinafter QUARTERLY REPORT], with id. at 4, tbl.2 (reporting $6.606 billion in
national revenues from interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives across all BHCs). Historically,
more than 61% of interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives was traded out of banks and their
subsidiaries rather than other BHC affiliates.
134. Among others, the OCC data covers consolidated global swaps activity by JP Morgan
Chase Bank NA, Citibank National Association, Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Bank of America NA,
Wells Fargo Bank NA, HSBC NA, State Street Bank & Trust Co, Bank of New York Mellon, PNC
Bank National Association, U.S. Bank National Association, Northern Trust Co., Suntrust Bank, and
Morgan Stanley Bank NA. See QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 133, at app. tbl.3.
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consolidated basis, showing that to the extent U.S. banks and their subsidiaries
explain the drop observed in CFTC data, that explanation is due to banks relocating
their dealing operations into off-shore subsidiaries. News stories support the view
that U.S. banks created offshore subsidiaries outside the CFTC’s purview to carry
on dealing operations.135
Changes in the swap dealing activities of U.S. banks and their subsidiaries likely
motivate a substantial portion of the decline observed in U.S. swaps markets.
Inter-dealer swap activity by entities other than U.S. banks and their subsidiaries is
likely inadequate to explain the decline in volume observed within the U.S.
inter-dealer market. Since on a consolidated basis, U.S. bank swap activity has not
substantially declined, as significant portion of the decline is owed to the migration
of swap activity from U.S. banks to their foreign subsidiaries. The next section
explains the cross-border reach of swaps regulations under Title VII and explores
the migration of swap activity from U.S. markets.
III. DOES THE SWAP EXPERIENCE SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION THEORY?
The preceding analysis supports that the advent of regulation coincided with
significant migration of wholesale swap operations from the United States. The
analysis also shows that the swap activity of U.S. end-users did not appreciably
decline (in fact, it increased). These observations inform related inquiries central to
scholarship on financial regulation: Did the exclusion of non-U.S. entities’ swap
activities with other non-U.S. persons undermine the policy goals of Title VII? And
more generally, is migration of financial activity a constraint on unilateral financial
regulation? The theory developed in this Part, consistent with observation of
relocation in the wake of regulation, shows that migration reduces the arsenal of
tools available to achieve regulatory priorities but does not empty that arsenal. The
theory also identifies that the vulnerability of financial regulation to mobility
depends on the policy goal being implemented. Policy goals targeting the
relationship between financial services providers and end-users, such as consumer
135. Charles Levinson, U.S. Banks Moved Billions of Dollars in Trades Beyond Washington’s
Reach, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-swaps/
[https://perma.cc/9XGG-Q96D ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ) (“Major banks had tweaked a few key
words in swaps contracts and shifted some other trades to affiliates in London, where regulations are
far more lenient. Those affiliates remain largely outside the jurisdiction of U.S. regulators, thanks to a
loophole in swaps rules that banks successfully won from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
in 2013.”); Thomas J. McCartin, A Derivative in Need: Rescuing U.S. Security-Based Swaps from the Race
to the Bottom, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 364 (2015) (explaining that non-regulation of swap activity by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage prompting
migration of swap activity offshore); see also Bonnie Kavoussi, Seven Largest U.S. Banks Have Created
Thousands Of Subsidiaries To Avoid Taxes: Fed Report, HUFFINGTON POST ( July 23, 2012), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/23/big-banks-subsidiaries_n_1694458.html [ https://perma.cc/
8L4K-WDPW ] (last visited July 30, 2018 ).
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protection and end-user market transparency, have been largely immune to
mobility. In contrast, policy goals such as the containment of systemic risk and
reduction of discriminatory pricing are more susceptible to offshoring. As discussed
below, however, a number of mitigants can be deployed within the United States to
dampen if not wholly mute the pernicious effects of migration. That these mitigants
have not been adopted speaks as much to general limitations on regulatory efficacy
as to the challenges posed by migration.
A. How Relocation of Swaps Activity Compromised Policy Goals
Title VII was enacted to “reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote
market integrity within the financial system.”136 The following discussion explores
how the movement of non-U.S. facing swap activity into foreign subsidiaries
undermined these three distinct policy goals.
1. Systemic Risk
Financial risk can be reduced down to risk of lower revenues or risk of higher
expenses (or lower cash in-flows or higher cash out-flows).137 How can the
unregulated activities of a foreign subsidiary increase risk of loss to the U.S. parent?
If the subsidiary follows a riskier policy, the value of the parent’s equity in the
subsidiary may be more volatile.138 Alternately, the parent may guarantee payments
on certain contracts by the subsidiary and be directly liable in the event of subsidiary
default.139 Or the defaults of a subsidiary can trigger cross-defaults under the
parent’s obligations.140 Finally, even without legal obligations, a U.S. bank may
voluntarily bail out a subsidiary, even though the parent enjoys limited liability.141
These are risks that can flow into the U.S. financial system from the unregulated
activity of foreign subsidiaries. If congressional views that unregulated swap market
activity contributed significantly to the financial crisis and broader economic
decline of 2008 are correct, then the migration of U.S. banks’ swap dealing
operations into foreign subsidiaries discussed above poses substantial risk of
precipitating another crisis.
136. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9733, 9735 (Feb. 17, 2012). See SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 387.
137. This assertion is not intended to minimize that secondary factors, such as volatility and
uncertainty, leverage, inter-connectivity and asymmetric information can exacerbate or mitigate losses.
138. This assumes the subsidiary is compensated for additional risk through higher expected
returns. If the subsidiary makes unwise decisions to take on more risk, the value of the parent’s equity
would not only be more volatile but also lower (even without a discount for volatility).
139. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1285 (“U.S. banks can avoid U.S. rules by using a foreign subsidiary
and only ‘implicitly’ guaranteeing [sic] its debt.”).
140. Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’
Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680, 2683 n.5 (2015).
141. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund,
N.Y. TIMES ( June 23, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html
[ https://perma.cc/6NMX-AZNZ ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 ).
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2. Market Transparency
Market transparency could benefit from non-U.S. subsidiaries reporting swap
transaction data with non-U.S. counterparties and application of other Title VII
initiatives abroad. European initiatives to bring market transparency to swap
markets have been less fruitful than those of the U.S.142 Having more data on the
prices at which transactions have been recently executed and could be executed in
the near future provides valuable information to market participants, including
those seeking to value inventories.143 Furthermore, in addition to the informational
benefits from ongoing reporting, there would be the transparency benefits from
comprehensive recordkeeping required under Title VII.144 The costs of migration
to market transparency, however, are likely to be relatively light given the substantial
amount of activity that remains in the United States. Recordkeeping interests are a
related concern to market transparency that geographically limited regulation
compromises. Recordkeeping ensures that prior dealings and current positions are
available to private parties and regulatory supervisors for analysis.
3. Market Integrity
Efforts to enhance market integrity were intended to protect end-users from
information asymmetries and potential exploitation by dealers.145 Limitations on the
applicability of Title VII obligations to trades between non-U.S. persons and
non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. banks can implicate these concerns. Did the
movement of swap activity expose the protected group to risk of abuse? The
reduction in trading was concentrated in inter-dealer activity.146 Many of the
anti-abuse rules are expressly limited to transactions between dealers and
end-users.147 Levels of end-user swap usage subject to Title VII protections were
not affected, and there is no evidence that non-U.S. subsidiaries were used to
142. Amir Khwaja, EMIR Trade Reporting and Public Data: What s the Point?, CLARUS
FIN.TECH. (April 28, 2014), https://www.clarusft.com/emir-trade-reporting-and-public-data-what-isthe-point/ [ https://perma.cc/KB9Q-5P35 ] ( last visited July 30, 2018 ).
143. See Ilya Beylin, Taxing Fictive Orders: How an Information-Forcing Tax Can Reduce
Manipulation and Distortion in Financial Product Markets, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 99 (2017); Kevin
Haeberle, Stock Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121 (2015); Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1887 (2013).
144. See supra note 79.
145. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9733, 9743 (Feb. 17, 2012) (“Taken together, the final rules materially
enhance the ability of counterparties to assess the merits of entering into any particular swap transaction
and reduce information asymmetries between swap dealers and . . . their counterparties.”).
146. Opting out of standards intended to protect counterparties from better informed swap
dealers does not come across as very troubling when the transaction is between two swap dealers.
147. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.431, 23.440, 23.450. See also Coffee, supra note 3, at 1287 (arguing
that international swap regulation should “focus more on those factors that truly relate to systemic risk
(e.g., capital, leverage, margin, etc.) and less on rules that relate to consumer protection or business
conduct.”).
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circumvent trading with U.S. end-users.148 As for trading with non-U.S. end-users,
there is a question of whether U.S. customer protection laws are meant to protect
non-U.S. clienteles? Home country regulators of those clienteles could have their
own views of appropriate protective measures for their domestic companies. And
those foreign companies could (if they wanted to) avail themselves of Title VII
protections through trading with U.S. based swap dealers rather than their foreign
subsidiaries. This approach would be a variant of the bonding hypothesis developed
by John Coffee in the securities context.149 The bonding hypothesis explains
cross-listing behavior of foreign issuers on U.S. exchanges as, in part, an opting into
U.S. securities law for the benefits of higher investor protections. Just as issuers can
partner with investors in committing to heightened investor protection by listing on
an exchange, end users can partner with dealers to opt into the customer protection
rules initiated by Title VII. In this manner, the protective benefits of market
integrity focused regulations could be exported at the election of foreign end-users.
The Title VII experience also illustrates an interesting exception to the general
principle that customers control whether customer-protection goals of a regulatory
regime are met. As explained in Part I, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, there were two
types of markets for swaps: (a) a “wholesale”, inter-dealer market, and (b) a “retail”
market for end-users. There is a view that dealers offered each other preferential
pricing in the former type of market, increasing relative costs for customers.150 Title
VII imposed registration and open access requirements on the electronic platforms
that were serving as inter-dealer markets. These requirements were meant to reduce
oligopolistic pricing and increase pre-trade price transparency.151 But these goals
were substantially circumvented as a number of foreign trading platforms limited
access to U.S. persons so as to be excluded from registration requirements as a SEF
or DCM and attendant open access mandates.152 Thus swap dealers were able to
retain two bands of pricing, and potentially continue oligopolistic extraction at the
expense of end-users through moving inter-dealer trades abroad. Where a regulation
polices how terms between one group of market participants compare with the
terms of another group of market participants—rather than sets absolute
requirements on terms between market participants—mobility can undermine
consumer protection notwithstanding that consumers are free to stay put (and
indeed, do appear to stay put). Short of traditional antitrust approaches or directly
policing pricing, it may be difficult to implement policies restricting financial

148. The longer term potential of U.S. end users setting up offshore subsidiaries to engage in
unregulated swap trading is discussed below.
149. See supra note 8.
150. See supra note 23 and surrounding text.
151. Because SEF and DCM requirements were also meant to contribute to pre-trade price
transparency, the arguments in this paragraph relate both to market transparency and market integrity.
152. SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 403–05 (D.D.C. 2014).
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institutions
from
discriminating
among
counterparties
without
153
international harmonization.
The subversion of rules meant to enact inclusive markets reveals a broader
threat from the relocation of financial institutions. When inter-dealer markets move
beyond regulation, the health of U.S. markets is implicated to the extent
U.S. markets rely on the function of the migrating market. If an offshore market
exhibits pathologies, entities that do not transact in the market may be affected so
long as they are holding related positions.
B. The Potential for Territorially Circumscribed Unilateral Financial Regulation
The above discussion shows how migration has undermined some more than
other Dodd-Frank policy goals. Given that a national regulatory regime will have
some geographic limits,154 does that mean a nation cannot effectively regulate
financial activity unilaterally? Pierre-Hugues Verdier theorizes that “the rise of
private international finance creates challenges for national regulation that states
cannot fully address by acting unilaterally.”155 Chris Brummer concisely articulates
the view of jurisdictional selection as a constraint on unilateral financial
regulation: “[F]inancial institutions dissatisfied with one jurisdiction’s rules can
increasingly move to another with weaker and potentially suboptimal oversight to
raise capital or engage in complex financial transactions.”156 Theorists view mobility
as a key threat to unilateral financial regulation.157 Is this a significant threat in

153. Some argue that the open access model is inappropriate for low-liquidity products such as
some swaps. See GIANCARLO & TUCKMAN, supra note 60. In this case, the flight of inter-dealer swap
markets may represent a desirable circumvention of regulatory priorities.
154. Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137, 1144 (2016);
Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,324 (“The Commission understands that commenters are
concerned that foreign entities, in order to avoid swap dealer status, may decrease their swap dealing
business with foreign branches of U.S. registered swap dealers and guaranteed affiliates that are swap
dealers”).
155. Verdier, supra note 3, at 1437.
156. Brummer, supra note 3, at 267. See Grinberg, supra note 154, at 1155 (“[L]ike multinational
corporate activity more generally, international finance is by nature highly mobile (indeed, in some
respects, more mobile). Rules targeting mobile capital, whether they involve tax or finance, are
inherently more difficult and inherently more likely to lead to competitive responses among states than
rules targeting product markets directly, because unlike capital, consumers rarely move to another
jurisdiction in response to strict regulatory standards”); Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory
Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 65 (2014) (“The ability of financial
institutions to act beyond the reach of regulators threatens the sovereignty of nation-states and the well
being of national economies. Yet as regulators are well aware, the threat is possible only because of
differences in national regulatory regimes.”)(internal citations omitted);Chris Brummer, Corporate Law
Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1089–103 (2008).
157. David Zaring, Financial Reform’s Internationalism, 65 EMORY L.J. 1255 (2016); Brummer,
supra note 3, at 262–63; Beth Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital
Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589 (2001); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The
Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 286 (1998).
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1. End-user Swap Activity Unaffected in the Short Term
The experience of end-users after the implementation of Title VII qualifies
both views that regulation severely impedes economic function and views that
regulation can be easily avoided. Figure III.A shows that end-users continued using
swaps subject to U.S. regulation following the implementation of Dodd-Frank.
There is no evidence that customers reduced using regulated swaps either in
substance or through relocation abroad. Subsequent research may find that the
increase in customer usage of swaps within the United States would have been
greater but for the regulation of swap markets, although a baseline that removes the
impact of swap regulation may be difficult to establish. What is clear is that a
massive regulatory intervention into swaps markets did not significantly interfere
with customer access to swaps.158 In contrast to inter-swap dealer activity,
U.S.-based speculation and hedging through swaps did not decline in the relevant
period. The lack of evidence that consumers of financial products were ready to
relocate to enable suppliers to avoid regulatory burdens supports that unilateral
regulation may be used to achieve some forms of customer protection.159
Many critiques of unilateral financial regulation focus narrowly on the mobility
of capital sources or, less narrowly, on the mobility of financial institutions.160 But
neither capital mobility nor mobility of financial institutions is sufficient to enable
regulatory arbitrage. Financial services are services and as such only provide
revenues to the financial institution if there is a client consuming them. It is
insufficient for the source of capital or the financial institution to be mobile if
regulation is also triggered by the customer being within the territory of the
regulator. The provision of most if not all financial services depends on a contract
performed between at least two persons one of which is a financial intermediary.
This provides several touchpoints for territorially circumscribed nexus to attach.161
As discussed above, the CFTC has taken a territorial approach that applies
swap regulation if either the swap dealer or its counterparty is a U.S. person (or the
transaction is conducted out of the United States). That means that end-users would
themselves have to also relocate for the transaction to escape the reach of
regulation. Financial services are an important ingredient to the successful operation
158. It is left to subsequent work to explore whether and under what circumstances restraints
on swap activity may have social costs. Subsequent studies may look to, among other things, whether
adding to the cost of risk management resulted in excess bankruptcy filings. Subsequent work may also
look to whether super-competitive pricing in swaps markets results in no significant changes in price
with the increase of regulatory costs.
159.
John Armour, Martin Bengtzen & Luca Enriques, Investor Choice in Global Securities
Markets 13 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 371/2017, 2017) (discussing
challenges in unilateral securities market regulation).
160. See supra notes 155–56.
161. Armour, Bengtzen & Enriques, supra note 159, at 13–19.
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of businesses. Yet there are many other ingredients, and it is questionable whether
a business would be willing to engage in the steps necessary to move its
consumption of financial services outside the ambit of U.S. regulation to reduce
regulatory costs. Key factors to assessing whether a business would create an
offshore entity with offshore operations to receive financial services are: (a) what
are the costs of creating that offshore presence and (b) what are the benefits from
obtaining a lighter regulatory regime from the perspective of the business and its
prospective financial services providers? The second of these two questions turns
largely on the net savings between the business and its service provider due to
decreased regulatory obligations. That decrease depends on the fixed costs and
variable costs of compliance as well as the frequency of regulated transactions (for
measuring total variable costs). The balance of these factors is expected to disfavor
relocation due to the typically substantial costs of relocation, the infrequency and
insignificance of financial services in the business model of the customer, and the
low amount of surplus in regulatory savings that can be shared between customers
and their financial services providers.
In the context of key financial services, the costs of customer relocation are
expected to be particularly significant. Is relocation practicable with respect to a
range of financial services involving potential customer liabilities: (1) loans;
(2) underwriting; (3) swaps? To reduce regulatory burdens (and presumably share
the resulting surplus) would a client be willing to form a foreign subsidiary, operate
it abroad and source financial services through that subsidiary? Would a financial
counterparty be willing to transact with that subsidiary? As the rest of this discussion
shows, the content of financial services matters when discussing how nimble private
efforts at circumvention may be. For example, lending is very different from deposit
taking because lending requires the bank to rely on the creditworthiness of the
customer. Without delving into loan underwriting standards, it is intuitive that a
bank would not typically lend to an uncapitalized subsidiary that has no operating
assets. Similarly, could regulations on underwriting be skirted through the client
creating a foreign subsidiary? Who would invest in a shell with no operations or
assets? Could swap regulations be avoided through creating an empty foreign
subsidiary? As discussed in more detail below, the answer is generally a resounding
“no.”162 Banks, investors, and other financial market participants require effective
recourse when the transaction creates a customer obligation. The rest of this
discussion furthers the literature on jurisdictional selection in response to financial
regulation through focusing on service specific capacities for mobility.
The empirical findings reviewed above cast a light on a practical constraint to
jurisdictional selection in response to financial regulation neglected by the literature.
Customer cooperation is typically required for financial institutions to avoid unilateral

162. See Grinberg, supra note 154, at 1155 (“[C]onsumers rarely move to another jurisdiction in
response to strict regulatory standards.”); Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
17 (2012).
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territorial regulation of a range of services aimed at protecting market participants. Under
robust territorial regulation, that cooperation requires more than legal structuring.
It requires a genuine relocation of assets and operations, including the headquarters
of the entity. This point is worth repeating. It is not sufficient to incur what are
typically referred to as transaction costs163 to avoid unilateral, territorial financial
regulation through relocation. Rather, actual movement of assets and decisional
resources is required.164 Not only that, but the personnel involved in the transaction
would need to be present in the new jurisdiction.165 So not only the management of
the entity but also the financial personnel negotiating the loan, underwriting or swap
with the relevant bank would need to work from another country. An investment
fund or other financial business that relies extensively on financial services may face
sufficient returns from sharing the surplus from deregulation to relocate, but most
businesses probably would not absent uncommonly costly regulations. Although at
the border it is an empirical question, as a matter of common sense it is unlikely that
the surplus from partnering in regulatory arbitrage in what are infrequent
transactions incidental to operating a non-financial business would outweigh the
expense of transitioning operations into another jurisdiction.166 This intuition is
reflected in corporate and tax167 scholarship on jurisdictional selection.
Mitchell Kane and Edward Rock explore the interdependence of jurisdictional
selection for corporate and tax law.168 Under the internal affairs doctrine, the
corporate law governing the relationship between the corporation, its officers,
directors and shareholders is determined by the state where the corporation is

163. Transaction costs are the search and information costs to identifying a potentially desirable
exchange, the bargaining and decision costs of entering into that exchange, and the policing and
enforcement costs of ensuring compliance with the exchange. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of
Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979).
164. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45309 (requiring the principal place of
business of an entity to be outside the United States to avoid the reach of swap regulation and explaining
the principal place of business “should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its
headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control and
coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board
meetings.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010).
165. See Grinberg, supra note 154, at 1154 (“Now imagine if [altering tax consequences] also
requires shifting activity; be that labor generally or particularly attractive research and development or
headquarters activity. In this case, the distributional consequences [between sovereigns] can affect both
government revenue and national employment.”).
166. Indirect transactions with U.S. non-financial businesses are also less likely to implicate
systemic risk concerns. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,324 (exempting transactions
with a non-U.S. affiliate guaranteed by a U.S. non-financial entity from counting towards the swap dealer
de minimis threshold).
167. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312
(2001) (discussing transaction costs as a constraint on tax arbitrage).
168. Kane & Rock, supra note 6.
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incorporated.169 This determination does not take into account the location of
corporate management, operations, assets or other tangible facets of corporate
existence. It is relatively easy, Kane and Rock show, for a U.S. firm to select its
corporate law from among the available state regimes simply by changing the state
of its incorporation (e.g., by creating a subsidiary in the desired jurisdiction and
merging the parent into that subsidiary).170 On the other hand, where the applicable
law turns on the facts such as where the headquarters of an entity are located
“changing jurisdictions . . . is often so costly as to be prohibitive.”171 Other scholars
agree with this intuition172 and empirical surveys of firm responses to regulation
generally support that business mobility to take advantage or regulatory disparities
is limited.173 A modest requirement could help ensure the “reality” of territorial
treatment in recognizing work as occurring in a jurisdiction only if the individual
performing it has a status such as permanent residency in that jurisdiction. For
management or negotiation to be seen as occurring in a foreign jurisdiction, the
individuals involved should be required to continuously reside in that jurisdiction.
The preceding discussion applies generally to the prospects of customer
collusion with regulatory avoidance. It is a non-trivial task to move what Kane and
Rock refer to as the “real seat”174 of an entity through creation of a foreign
subsidiary and offshoring its principal place of business. But the challenges are even
greater in the context of services creating long term customer obligations such as
loans, underwriting or swaps. It is not enough for the customer to create a foreign
subsidiary and then transfer personnel and other operational resources into that
subsidiary and physically relocate them abroad. The customer must also assure the
financial services provider that any obligations the subsidiary incurs in the course
of receiving the services will be repaid with an adequate rate of return.175 That either
requires a transfer of assets that can support the obligation or a guarantee from an
affiliate with the financial wherewithal to make good on the obligation. Both are

169. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32
J. CORP. L. 33, 39 (2006); Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339
(2018).
170. Kane & Rock, supra note 6, at 1236.
171. Id. at 1237.
172. Eric L. Talley, supra note 6, at 1676.
173. Carruthers & Lamoreaux, supra note 5 (reviewing literature).
174. Kane & Rock, supra note 6, at 1235.
175. The surrounding discussion is not intended to suggest that subsidiaries are generally
formed for illegitimate purposes. There is a wide range of scholarship explaining respectable and
practical uses housing assets and operations in subsidiaries serves. See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony
J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2013) (explaining how private ordering can take place through creation of
subsidiaries within a mandatory bankruptcy regime); Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis,
Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 568 (2007) (explaining how partitioning
of assets across subsidiaries may allow more informed and less expensive financing). But cf. Richard
Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (2011) (arguing that the
benefits of subsidiaries are inconsistent with the practice of affiliate cross-guarantees).
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explored further below, as the discussion turns first to formal and implicit
guarantees and then reviews treasury affiliates that may serve as conduits to swap
transactions.
At the outset, it is important to note that asset transfers are expensive because
they reduce the transferor affiliate’s assets (e.g., if a parent transfers unencumbered
title to a plot of land to its subsidiary to be used as collateral for the financing
service, the parent acting alone can no longer borrow against that plot of land). Due
to structural subordination, the contribution of assets to a subsidiary to support
external financing to the subsidiary reduces assets available to claim-holders on the
parent. In the best case scenario from the standpoint of the avoidance partnership
between the U.S. customer and financial institution, the financing would be used
to purchase liquid assets with non-volatile values that could be held at the subsidiary
to effectively collateralize the loan.176 Yet, it is relatively rare that operating
businesses seek financing to purchase something like high grade securities or gold.
Instead, the financing would likely go towards operating assets that would need a
substantial top-off from the parent because of their limited expected secondary
market value. Thus, from the perspective of the U.S. customer, there would usually
be an appreciable cost to receiving financing through an otherwise empty offshore
subsidiary. A similar cost would arise in swap transactions, which are risk shifting
rather than financing transactions but nevertheless involve the potential for long
term customer liabilities. To ensure the foreign subsidiary of the U.S. customer
would be able to meet its potential future obligations under the swap, the parent
would need to transfer assets akin to initial and variation margin to the subsidiary.
This would have costs similar to those described above.
As an alternative to providing separate assets to a foreign entity, the
U.S. customer could guarantee the foreign subsidiary’s obligations. This is a
straightforward manner for assuring the subsidiary can repay financial obligations
from the parent’s assets. However, the cross-border reach of swap regulations has

176. The preceding discussion considers financing assets at the subsidiary level. If instead, the
U.S. customer routed the financing through the subsidiary and purchased assets at the U.S. entity level,
substantially greater service fees would be involved. The need to retain credit support at the subsidiary
means financing transactions routed through the subsidiary will be less effective because the subsidiary
will need to retain a portion of the net financing to the U.S. parent. This reduction need not be on a
one-for-one basis due to differences in tax and other costs to financing the subsidiary relative to the
parent (including, potentially, the relatively higher regulatory burdens of servicing the parent directly);
however, the difference is not expected to be drastic. Even if only seventy-five percent of the proceeds
from the financing transaction need to be retained at the subsidiary to satisfy the bank counterparty,
the resulting expense of the avoidance strategy is extraordinary. To achieve the same level of financing
as it would have received directly, the customer would need to engage in a transaction four times as
large as it would need to if transacting directly with the bank. That means the bank would need to
reduce its fees by seventy five percent when dealing with the subsidiary to offer the same economics.
What is the likelihood that the regulatory costs of dealing directly with the parent exceed seventy five
percent of the fee the bank charges?
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been drawn to limit this strategy.177 Transactions between a non-U.S. swap dealer
and a non-U.S. entity that has a guarantee from a U.S. affiliate are subject to swap
regulations.178 The CFTC and SEC view a wide range of financial support
arrangements as guarantees for this purpose.179 Thus a U.S. customer could not
simply create a foreign subsidiary, establish a small headquarters for it in the relevant
jurisdiction, guarantee the subsidiary’s trades, and source swaps from foreign swap
dealers outside the ambit of Title VII.180
There are less overt means than express guarantees that provide credit support
to Potemkin subsidiaries built for partnering in regulatory avoidance. A
U.S. business could—without entering into a legal agreement—express its intent to
a service provider to guarantee any shortfall from an offshore subsidiary. Writing in
the context of tax planning, Alex Raskolnikov has demonstrated how norms (in
contrast to legal obligations) can enable parties to a transaction to skirt legal
responsibilities.181 Yet reliance on norms introduces substantial risk, particularly
where the party being relied on is not a frequent player.182 If a non-U.S. subsidiary
is not legally guaranteed and will have relatively few assets following the transaction,
would a non-U.S. bank lend to that subsidiary? Would it enter into a swap
transaction with that subsidiary? Would non-U.S. underwriters and investors help
market and purchase securities issued by that subsidiary? Raskolnikov shows that a
norm is sufficient to skirt taxes on interest from secured lending through
repackaging the transaction as a sale and repurchase (e.g., municipal securities
dealers “sell” tax exempt municipal bonds to banks and then “repurchase” them
shortly thereafter with the bank pocketing the interest on the bond as a tax free
financing charge).183 Similarly, he shows that higher taxes on short term equity
trading may be avoided through papering the transactions as long term equity swaps
and then, with the cooperation of the swap dealer and without explicit rights,
terminating them or rolling them into other trades.184 Yet in these examples, the
financial services provider would only lose a fee such as interest or a termination
177. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,312.
178. See id. at 45,355 (substituted compliance is available with respect to transactions between
“a non-U.S. swap dealer . . . and a non-U.S. counterparty . . . where the non-U.S. counterparty’s
performance is guaranteed (or otherwise supported by) a U.S. person”).
179. See id. at 45,320; Coffee, supra note 3, at 1285 (criticizing SEC rules for only reaching
express rather than implicit guarantees).
180. Nor could the financial services provider escape swap dealer regulation through trading
with foreign guaranteed affiliates of U.S. persons. See id. at 45,319 (a “non-U.S. person should count
only its swap dealing transactions with U.S. persons . . . and with guaranteed affiliates towards the de
minimis thresholds for swap dealer registration”).
181. Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 601 (2007).
182. Id. at 671 (explaining the relevant costs of defection by a borrower with little repeat play
and a lender that constantly makes new loans in the market and thus substantially relies on
reputational capital).
183. Id. at 626–27.
184. Id. at 620.
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charge should the customer defect. In contrast, facing an under-capitalized
subsidiary on a loan that is disbursed to the subsidiary and then upstreamed by the
subsidiary to its parent or similar transaction exposes the financial service provider
to losses of far greater magnitude. It is questionable whether norms are in and of
themselves adequate to enable these forms of avoidance.185
The second path to creating a credit-worthy foreign subsidiary is normatively
more ambiguous than naked attempts at avoidance. That second path involves
setting up what is generally referred to as a treasury affiliate and organizing that
affiliate abroad. It is common for large global companies to centralize their hedging
or risk-management activities in an affiliate commonly referred to as a “treasury”
entity.186 Under this structure, the treasury entity may enter into swaps with its
affiliates and then enter into offsetting swaps with swap dealers (or other third
parties). The CFTC recognizes that this model “promotes operational efficiency
and prudent risk management by enabling a company to manage its risks on a
consolidated basis at a group level.”187 The treasury affiliate may be organized as a
U.S. or non-U.S. subsidiary of the parent company, and the CFTC refers to these
entities alternately as “conduit affiliates” or “affiliate conduits.” Because a foreign
treasury entity may serve as an intermediary shifting risk between its U.S. affiliates
and non-U.S. swap dealers, the CFTC applies swap regulations to the conduct of
affiliate conduits in some circumstances.188 The regulation of conduit affiliates
covers some but far from all cases in which a U.S. customer establishes bona fide
treasury operations abroad to receive swap services from non-U.S. dealers.
The existence of a path to avoidance is not the same as its regular use. Figure
III.A shows that U.S. customers have not slowed sourcing swap transactions in the
United States. Thus, it does not appear that the route left open for regulatory

185. See Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2008).
186. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,358.
187. Id.
188. For these purposes, an affiliate conduit is an entity that meets a complex definition, and
the CFTC has provided inconsistent descriptions of whether and how affiliate conduits may be
regulated. Compare id. at 45,324 (“The Commission’s policy is to generally allow non-U.S. persons not
to count toward their de minimis thresholds their swap dealing transactions with . . . a conduit affiliate
that is not a swap dealer and itself engages in de minimis swap dealing activity and which is affiliated
with a swap dealer”), with id. at 45,359 (“The Commission does not intend that the term ‘conduit
affiliate’ would include affiliates of swap dealers.”). In considering whether a non-U.S. person is an
“affiliate conduit”, the CFTC considers whether: (i) the non-U.S. person is a majority owned affiliate
of a U.S. person; (ii) the non-U.S. person is controlling, controlled by or under common control with
the U.S. person; (iii) the financial results of the non-U.S. person are included in the consolidated
financial statements of the U.S. person; and (iv) the non-U.S. person, in the regular course of business,
engages in swaps with non-U.S. third-parties for the purpose of hedging or mitigating risks faced by, or
to take positions on behalf of, its U.S. affiliate(s), and enters into offsetting swaps or other arrangements
with its U.S. affiliates in order to transfer the risks and benefits of such swaps with third-parties to its
U.S. affiliates. Id. at 45,359. The CFTC notes that other facts and circumstances also may be relevant
to determining if an entity is a conduit affiliate. Id.

Second to Printer_Beylin (Do Not Delete)

544

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

2/26/2020 10:56 AM

[Vol. 10:497

avoidance through mobility has been extensively adopted. This is consistent with
market participants foregoing the opportunity to reduce regulatory burdens through
other means.189 A variety of reasons—including implementation costs, uncertainty
about efficacy, moral reservations, norms, organizational inertia, agency costs
within legal and compliance departments—can lead customers (or financial services
providers) to abstain from opportunities to reduce regulatory burdens. Yet, the
abstention may be temporary, as new market norms, practices and structures may
take time to gain widespread adoption.
CFTC guidance on the cross-border reach of Title VII regulations leaves an
important gap. A U.S. swap customer can, through a bona fide foreign treasury
entity, generally accept swap dealing services outside the scope of U.S. swap
regulation.190 The strategy relies on the method by which swap dealer status is
determined in the cross-border context. Only swaps with U.S. nexus count towards
a de minimis threshold below which an entity does not have to register as a swap
dealer or comply with the various requirements applicable to swap dealers.191 A
non-U.S. person financial institution dealing swaps to foreign treasury affiliates
(among other non-U.S. persons) would not have to register as a swap dealer and
thus could avoid the associated Title VII requirements.192 Figure IV.C.1 shows the
structure for effecting this arrangement.193 In this manner, U.S. customers
could—through creating offshore treasury affiliates—share any surplus from a laxer
offshore regulatory environment with their offshore financial services provider. It

189. For example, to avoid regulations triggered by notional value thresholds, parties could have
rewritten the terms of their swap transactions to decrease notional amounts while increasing applicable
rates. Yet review of notional data following the implementation of Title VII shows that parties have
not sought to exploit this loophole.
190. One may argue that subsidiary treasury entities of U.S. persons should be treated
differently than subsidiary treasury entities of non-U.S. persons. However, this argument must contend
with the relative ease of changing the holding company domicile of a business and the relative
competitiveness of U.S. and foreign businesses. The literature on the use of inversions to escape
worldwide taxation of U.S. corporations provides decades of thoughtful analysis around these
questions. See Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2015);
Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807
(2014); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and
Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409 (2002).
191. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,318.
192. Id. at 45,319 (“Non-U.S. persons that are not guaranteed or conduit affiliates are not
required to count swaps with a conduit affiliate towards the swap dealer de minimis calculation.”); id.
at 45,324 n.310 (“Note that if a non-U.S. person that is not a guaranteed or conduit affiliate of a
U.S. person engages in a swap dealing transaction with another non-U.S. person that is not a guaranteed
affiliate of a U.S. person (including such non-U.S. person that is a swap dealer), then such swap dealing
transaction does not count toward the de minimis threshold of the unregistered, swap dealing party.”).
It is less clear whether the approach for skirting swap regulation described in this paragraph could work
with a guaranteed non-U.S. subsidiary of a U.S. person as opposed to an affiliate conduit.
193. Large trader reporting requirements may apply to some swap transactions between a
non-U.S. person that is not a swap dealer providing swaps to a non-U.S. treasury affiliate. See id.
at 45,364.
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is perhaps out of concern for these structures that the CFTC smudged the ink and
created substantial uncertainty when authoring its cross-border guidance.194

Figure IV.C.1: Non-U.S. Treasury Affiliate used to source swaps from
non-U.S. entity providing swaps but not registered as a swap dealer.
To date, however, empirical observation does not support theories that
customers would shift their operations abroad in response to financial regulation.
This observation is consistent with expected cost-benefit calculations that
customers face in deciding whether to move operations to a foreign subsidiary to
share in the savings from regulatory avoidance.
As noted above, the use of non-U.S. treasury affiliates and the consequent
avoidance of swap regulations are normatively gray. U.S. swap regulations may
indeed reduce systemic risk, in which case regulation may be desirable and its
avoidance a social cost.195 Systemic risk represents an externality, and if that

194. Compare id. at 45,359 (indicating that only certain conditions to the inter-affiliate exemption
and real time reporting would apply), with id. at 45,369 (indicating that transaction level requirements
would apply although substituted compliance would be available). It is not clear if non-U.S. persons
providing swap dealing services to conduit affiliates may be required to register as swap dealers,
although it generally appears that such non-U.S. person could operate without
registering: “Non-U.S. persons that are not guaranteed or conduit affiliates are not required to count
swaps with a conduit affiliate towards the swap dealer de minimis calculation.” Id. at 45,319.
195. Commercial end-users entering into a swap to hedge are usually exempt from clearing,
platform execution and margin requirements suggesting that Congress and regulators do not view the
systemic risks consequences as high. There are also impacts on market transparency and (under what
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externality is not contained through other equally effective means, the avoidance of
swap regulations will have social costs. This assumes that non-U.S. regime(s) for
containing systemic risk are inferior to the U.S. regime.196 This patriotic assumption
may have some validity; perhaps jurisdictions compete to house financial activity at
the behest of powerful financial institution constituents or for other reasons; or
perhaps jurisdictions differ in sizing systemic risk or the private costs of regulation,
or differ in their views of optimal means for containing systemic risk.197 At the very
least, the possibility that some jurisdictions do more to mitigate systemic risk enjoys
broad acceptance in the literature.
In summary, empirical evidence and theoretical considerations support that
customers are unlikely to move in a manner that permits financial service providers
to skirt regulatory obligations. This provides a measure of comfort that some policy
goals may be achieved unilaterally. Yet as discussed above in Section IV.A.3, some
methods of achieving customer protection may rely not only on activities within the
customer-serving market but also other markets. The goal of enabling customers to
take advantage of the same terms dealers offered one another through mandatory
platform execution relied on inter-dealer trading remaining within the purview of
U.S. regulation. The move of inter-dealer swap activity offshore thus undermined
this method of allaying concerns with oligopolistic conduct among dealers. This
shows that migration, even if it does not involve customers, can complicate the
regulatory project by requiring use of less elegant tools such as
traditional enforcement.
2. Inter-dealer Activity Migrates
As reflected in Figure III.A, the great majority of swap activity is conducted
between a relatively small number of swap dealing institutions. Due to the immense
volume of inter-dealer swap activity, the heavier regulatory burdens imposed on
swap dealers, and their personnel’s expertise in financial structuring, greater
mobility is to be expected of dealer-to-dealer transactions than customer serving
transactions. At the risk of letting the tail wag the dog, it is also noteworthy that
dealers are more likely to be comfortable without the certainty American legal
institutions offer. Major financial institutions transacting with each other are less
likely to demand the protections of developed legal and regulatory regimes due to
relatively lower informational asymmetries, substantial reputational capital and
expertise in tailoring contractual arrangements (which can substitute for the
protections of public law). The private benefits of coordinated relocation are thus
substantially higher and the costs substantially lower in the context of inter-dealer
markets than customer markets.
may be termed a paternalistic view) market integrity from the migration of transactions abroad through
conduit affiliates.
196. See supra note 9.
197. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151, 177–78 (2011).
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As discussed above, the dramatic implosion of U.S. swap market activity seen
in CFTC data is owed in substantial part to the movement of U.S. banks’ swap
dealing operations into foreign subsidiaries. These swap activities do not involve
U.S. counterparties, but rather non-U.S. persons that may have preexisted the
promulgation of the CFTC’s cross-border guidance or have been established
subsequently. These foreign counterparties may be subsidiaries of U.S. based
financial institutions or may be foreign based financial institutions. And the
migrating swap activities are truly conducted abroad rather than merely papered as
between non-U.S. counterparties while being negotiated from the United States.
Because they operate wholly outside the United States, these subsidiaries are exempt
from registration as swap dealers and hence free from the panoply of Title VII
regulations applicable to swap dealers. How problematic is this migration?
Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks engaging in unregulated swaps trading with
other major financial institutions risks accumulation of systemic risk in
contravention of the policy animating Title VII.198 If as Congress concluded and
many scholars argue, unsupervised interdependence between financial institutions
established through opaque swap relationships contributed to the financial crisis,
the re-creation of these unregulated webs offshore can be cause for concern.199 The
concerning activities, however, take place in subsidiaries rather than U.S. banks
directly and this adds a significant measure of protection. A fundamental premise
of corporate law is that parents have no obligation for the liabilities of their
subsidiaries provided that basic formalities are maintained.200 Yet this protection is
qualified. First, the equity interest in the subsidiary may represent a material asset
of the parent. Second, financial relationships with the subsidiary such as loans or
derivatives may additionally expose the parent to losses in the event the subsidiary
founders. Third, parents have been known to voluntarily bail out their children
(notwithstanding fraudulent conveyance risk, fiduciary duties to parental
shareholders, and other legal niceties). And fourth, co-branding, inter-affiliate
service agreements, and other operational interdependencies between entities can
undermine the parent when the subsidiary stumbles. Financial regulators should be
wary of the buildup of systemic risk in offshore subsidiaries.
Fortunately, regulators can be granted or already have tools to deal with
systemic risk at the domestic parent level. The means to stem systemic risk discussed

198. As discussed above, the offshoring also implicates market transparency concerns, and to a
far lesser extent due to the institutions being generally able to fend for themselves, concerns of fraud
and abuse.
199. See Viral Acharya et al., The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes and Remedies, 18
FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 89 (2009); George W. Madison, Gary J. Cohen
& William A. Shirley, Financial Regulatory Reform: Key Changes That Reduced Systemic Risk,
BANK. & FIN. SERV. ( Jan. 2015).
200. WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS
(Foundation Press, 10th ed. 2006).
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here primarily relate to banks as opposed to non-bank affiliates within a bank
holding company. Congress could, however, unilaterally expand the authority of the
Federal Reserve to similarly police interactions between U.S. entities within a bank
holding company and their foreign subsidiaries.201
U.S. banking regulators may have legislative authority to limit the flow of risk
between a U.S. bank and its foreign subsidiaries.202 For example, Basel III
contemplates that national regulators will determine haircuts applicable to
investments in consolidated subsidiaries.203 Under statutory authority to define
capital standards, U.S. banking regulators can force greater discounts on equity in
foreign subsidiaries than on domestic subsidiaries to account for the greater risk of
unregulated activity.204
Beyond capital requirements, banking agencies already have scaffolding for
firewalling off unregulated activities of non-U.S. subsidiaries. The Federal Reserve
has promulgated Regulation K, Subpart A205 to address the unique powers and
obligations related to the foreign activities of U.S. banking organizations. Additional
means exist for policing guarantees or other credit support that may make a
U.S. entity liable for the obligations of its non-U.S. affiliates. Sections 23A/B
restrict banks’ and their subsidiaries’ transactions with affiliates in part to reduce
the risk of FDIC insurance being used to subsidize non-bank activity.206 Currently,
transactions between banks and their subsidiaries are generally exempt from these
restrictions.207 Restrictions on affiliate transactions could be expanded for
non-U.S. subsidiaries of banks to protect the bank from its subsidiary’s default (and
to prevent the bank from bailing out the subsidiary).208 Reliance on Sections

201. Legislation could also capture arrangements between members of the U.S. shadow banking
sector and their offshore affiliates.
202. Non-bank swap dealers may emerge and, indeed, one famously has. Interest rate Derivatives
House of the Year: Citadel Securities, supra note 125. The emergence of swap dealers unaffiliated with
banks may require Congress to provide regulators with new authorities vis-à-vis hedge funds and other
participants in the so called “shadow banking” sector. See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow
Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411 (2017); Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, Shadow Banking: A Review
of the Literature, in BANKING CRISES (Garett Jones ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2016).
203. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III
DEFINITION OF CAPITAL – FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2017). The approach of limiting
failure to an unregulated foreign subsidiary ex post rather than regulating the subsidiary ex ante to prevent
it from taking on excessive risk is admittedly a second best approach. In another context, Stephen
J. Lubben and Arthur Wilmarth have raised substantial questions as to whether large financial
conglomerates can manage the liquidity of their affiliates in an independent manner that recognizes
corporate separation (and counterparties’ abilities to monitor whether these practices are taking place)
particularly in times of market stress. See Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur Wilmarth, Too Big and Unable to
Fail, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1205, 1229 (2017).
204. There is precedent for this approach in the treatment of bank financial subsidiary equity.
See 12 C.F.R. § 3.22(a)(7) (2019).
205. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1–.13 (2019).
206. See Federal Reserve Act, §§ 23A–B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c to 371c-1 (2018).
207. See id. § 23A(b)(2)(A). Financial subsidiaries are generally treated as affiliates rather than
bank subsidiaries. Id. § 23A(e).
208. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,320 (discussing implicit guarantees).
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23A/B to police dependencies of U.S. banks and unregulated foreign subsidiaries
may admittedly be an imperfect solution in practice as inter-affiliate arrangements
are difficult to monitor, particularly in cases of informal agreements carried out by
individuals with strong personal relationships or, in some cases, roles across
multiple entities. Additional separation of roles and personnel may be necessary to
further financial independence of banks from their foreign subsidiaries.
To address some of the risk to customer relationships from foreign subsidiary
default, banks can be required to use trademarks, branding, and other identification
for foreign operations and the subsidiaries housing them that is unrelated to the
parent bank. Banking regulators can prohibit banks from allowing cross-defaults
triggered by foreign subsidiaries. And banking regulators can prohibit banks from
bailing out their subsidiaries when an injection of funds could create instability for
the parent institution.
To deter diversion of parental assets to subsidiaries during times of stress,
restrictions on asset contributions to foreign subsidiaries can be implemented.
These restrictions may place caps on contributions during a given period or
condition contributions on the absence of severely adverse market conditions. The
former requires the parent to undertake a measured, deliberate policy when growing
a foreign subsidiary and prevents bail outs. The latter prevents bailouts at a time
when other financial institutions may be distressed. Either approach, however, may
not work because during a crisis regulators may forbear from enforcement.209 It is
unclear if our political institutions have the discipline to apply law in times of crisis,
especially when the broader consequences are hard to predict and will result in some
businesses failing in the short term.210 Ex ante prevention of risk concentration
through international harmonization rather than ex post containment of risk
through barriers between parents and subsidiaries during a crisis represents a
potentially more efficient approach to stemming systemic risk. For that reason,
regulating dealing activities similarly across the globe may be preferable to limiting
blowback from activity through insulating U.S. entities from unregulated offshore
affiliates. This is another example where unilateral solutions exist, though
harmonization allows for more efficacious designs for achieving policy priorities.
This example also shows how harmonization permits regulatory design to
bypass shortcomings in domestic lawmaking institutions. The above proposal to
cabin risk in foreign subsidiaries would require cooperation between the CFTC and
SEC, on the one hand, and the banking regulators (e.g., the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC), on the
other hand, or at least an understanding of the former’s regulations by the latter.211
209. See POSNER, supra note 3.
210. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C.L. REV. 1683 (2011) (explaining regulatory willingness
to relax prohibitions on inter-affiliate transactions during the financial crisis).
211. Judge, supra note 3, at 901 (discussing failure of coordination between Federal Reserve and
SEC).
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In other words, banking regulators would have to identify foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. banks that would have been swap dealers under CFTC and SEC rules if they
had been conducting their operations in the U.S. Banking regulators would further
have to amend current rules governing bank subsidiaries to provide U.S. bank
parents protection commensurate with the risk from unregulated conduct of their
offshore subsidiaries. This poses an institutional problem where a host of banking
regulators need to measure and fill a lacuna left by the territorial limitation of
regulations written primarily by the CFTC and SEC. Yet this coordination problem
is not predominantly owed to mobility of U.S. financial institutions but rather to
the unique fragmentation of the U.S. financial regulatory system.212 Unlike most of
its peer countries, the United States has splintered financial regulation across a
multitude of agencies (serving, in part, the campaign finance goals of legislators
controlling the distinct committees to which these agencies are beholden). These
institutional features create challenges to effective unilateral regulation, which
harmonization helps bypass.
The discussion above shows how the migration of inter-dealer markets
undermines the regulatory architecture developed to reduce systemic risk. It also
shows that migration does not necessarily undermine policy goals in the absence of
harmonization; rather, the susceptibility of a unilateral regime to relocation is
determined jointly by the lawmakers architecting the regime and the private parties
responding to it. As this example shows, design error or political compromise may
lead lawmakers to architect regimes in manners susceptible to private parties opting
out through relocation.
The above concerns with migration and proposals for addressing it are
premised on a nationalistic assumption that U.S. regulations strike the correct
balance between social and private costs. It may be that U.S. regulations are overly
strict while the regulations in the jurisdiction to which activities have migrated are
overly lax. Viewing mobility as a form of undesirable avoidance assumes that the
host jurisdiction has a relatively superior regime. It remains for future work to
normatively assess the flight of U.S. swap activity abroad.213

212. Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and
Comparative Perspectives ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 517, 2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1579048 [ https://perma.cc/HYF8-M7S8 ]
( last visited July 30, 2018 ); Sabrina R. Pellerin, John R. Walter & Patricia E. Wescott, The Consolidation
of Financial Regulation: Pros, Cons, and Implications for the United States, 95 ECON. Q. 121 (2009);
Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the
United States (Harv. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working PaperNo. 09-19, 2008), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1300431 [ https://perma.cc/VPY5-US9T ] ( last visited
July 30, 2018 ); United States Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial
Regulatory Structure (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
Blueprint.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3FE9-FNSM ] (last visited July 30, 2018 ).
213. There is no serious contention that legislation regulating the financial industry is based on
a wonkish calculus of benefits and costs. And the agencies implementing financial regulations are
generally not constrained to promulgating only those regulations with positive net benefits. Jeffrey
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CONCLUSION
This preceding discussion develops the debate on the necessity of
internationally harmonizing financial regulations. This conventional view was based
on the supposition that financial institutions could relocate to subvert regulations.
This Paper both substantiates the core concerns of international financial
regulation—supporting that financial institutions do indeed relocate operations
following regulatory intervention—and challenges that regulatory policy is
categorically susceptible to such relocation. Depending on the policy goal, unilateral
financial regulation may be more or less effective to achieve it.
The applicability of regulations governing financial services does not turn on
just the location of the services provider but also on the location of the customer.
The rhetoric concerning “financial institutions” relocating, rather than “financial
service providers” helps elide the reality that all financial activity directly or
indirectly serves customers and involves at least two parties. The swap market
experience presented in this paper shows that customers are less likely to relocate
than services providers in the wake of regulations. This is not just an empirical
observation. It is consistent with models of relative benefits and costs from
relocation to customers and their suppliers. Customers tend to be subject to lighter
regulatory burdens than service providers and to less frequently engage in regulated
conduct. As a result, the relative benefits in regulatory savings of migrating
customer-serving transactions are significantly lower than those of migrating
transactions between financial services providers. Regulations aimed at markets

N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEG. STUD. S351
(2014). Imminent scholars disagree as to the prospects for arriving at a cost-benefit based design of
financial regulation, as opposed to design based on reasoned application of experience and judgment.
Compare id., and Coates, supra note 114, with Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 YALE L.J.F. 246 (2015) (arguing for further research
and identifying that financial markets produce unusually high amounts of data that may be useful for
measuring benefits and costs). Some of the same issues plaguing ex ante design stymie ex post
measurement. For leading efforts in measuring systemic risk, which is perhaps the most slippery of the
priorities of financial regulators, see efforts by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland to develop
a public systemic risk indicator. System Risk Indicator, FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND, https://
www.clevelandfed.org/our-research/indicators-and-data/systemic-risk-indicator.aspx [ https://
perma.cc/4HX7-PDBJ ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ). The indicator, however, is based on implied
market expectations of bank default and does not provide a ready answer for how leverage,
maturity-mismatch, inter-connectedness, opaque financial dependencies, or other variables commonly
referenced as contributors affect systemic risk. Inability to measure and compare the health of
regulatory environments across jurisdictions calls into question a swath of normative scholarship in
financial regulation. Because there is no available measure for the quality of financial regulation, many
scholarly discussions amount at best to expressions of judgment and informed guesswork. For example,
it is difficult to understand whether a race-to-the bottom or top is taking place without being able to
compare the quality of regulation, and similarly, recommendations for experimentation among
jurisdictions do not address how the results of the experiment would be measured and learned from.
Cf. Griffith, supra note 49, at 1293–94 (explaining calls for harmonization as based on concerns with a
race to the bottom, while encouraging experimentation in part to separate successful from unsuccessful
approaches to financial regulation).
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between financial institutions and their customers such as those seeking customer
protection goals are less likely to be susceptible to regulatory arbitrage
through relocation.
In contrast, markets between financial services providers are relatively more
mobile. Thus, goals concerned with regulating these markets are more reliant on
harmonization. Yet even in this context, unilateral financial regulation may be
largely successful. If the goal is prevention of systemic risk inflow to U.S. financial
institutions, restrictions on a U.S. parent may be adequate notwithstanding a liberal
regime governing the activities of a foreign subsidiary. These restrictions, however,
may be difficult to implement in practice due to institutional constraints such as
challenges to inter-agency coordination and political over-rides in times of crisis.
International harmonization is desirable not because of the mobility of financial
institutions without more but because of shortcomings in our lawmaking apparatus,
many of them self-imposed.
The mobility of financial institutions, however, raises concerns beyond those
of thwarting regulatory agendas. Migration of economic activity to avoid regulation
creates what tax scholars214 refer to as deadweight loss. The migration also has
distributive consequences as countries with laxer laws attract businesses and the
attendant benefits such as greater employment and taxes. These costs of mobility
itself, rather than the limitations mobility imposes on policy objectives motivating
financial regulation, are a topic for subsequent scholarship.

214. HENRY J. AARON & JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, HOW TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,
BROOKINGS (1981). Deadweight loss figures prominently in the normative analysis of tax law, where
it is a measure of private loss induced through legal intervention. This type of deadweight loss also
occurs in response to financial and other regulation. As a harm, deadweight loss is not solely caused
through government intervention and anti-trust scholarship provides a careful study of how private
collusion can create deadweight loss relative to a competitive market baseline. See Douglas Melamed,
Antitrust Law is not That Complicated Response, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 163, 164 (2017).
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APPENDIX A
Swap Market Regulation Timeline215
On December 31, 2012, swap dealers had to register as such.216
On January 1, 2013, a number of swap dealer specific obligations came into
effect:
Prohibitions on fraud;217
Providing the daily mark of swap transactions;218
Fair dealing standards applicable to swap dealer communications;219
Diligence on recommended swaps and strategies;220
Restrictions on political contributions;221
Risk management program;222
Business continuity requirements;223
Monitoring of position limits;224
Diligent supervision of swap personnel;225
Conflicts of interest policies and procedures;226
Accessibility of information to regulators;227
Antitrust considerations;228
Designation of chief compliance officer for already regulated
entities;229
Portfolio compression for already regulated entities;230
Trade confirmation requirements;231

215. For sources, see MAYER BROWN LLP, BY WHEN? – THE CFTC’S DODD-FRANK
COMPLIANCE DATES, https://www.isda.org/a/1niDE/df-effectiveness-timelines.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/VVF4-BU8L ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ); Swaps Made Available to Trade Determination,
CFTC, https://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=%20SwapsMadeAvailableToTradeDetermination
[ https://perma.cc/FMY6-35MW ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 ); SWAPS MADE AVAILABLE TO TRADE
(Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@otherif/documents/
file/swapsmadeavailablechart.pdf [ https://perma.cc/XVW7-BRHZ]. ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019 )
216. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 3.10, 23, 23.21–22, 170.16 (2019).
217. See id. § 23.410(a), (b).
218. See id. § 23.431(d).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. § 23.600.
223. See id. § 23.603.
224. See id. § 23.601.
225. See id. § 23.602.
226. See id. § 23.605.
227. See id. § 23.606.
228. See id. § 23.607.
229. See id. § 3.3.
230. See id. § 23.503.
231. See id. § 23.501.
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On March 10, 2013, portfolio compression became mandatory for swap
dealers that were not subject to regulation prior to registration as swap dealers;232
On March 11, 2013, swap clearing became mandatory with respect to major
swaths of the interest rate and credit default swap market where the transaction was
between so called “Category 1 Entities” (which include swap dealers and very large
private funds);233
On April 3, 2013, swap dealers that were not subject to regulation prior to
registering as swap dealers had to designate a chief compliance officer;234
On May 1, 2013, a number of additional regulations became applicable to swap
dealers:
General provisions such as anti-evasion rules and know your
counterparty rules became applicable;235
Confidential treatment of counterparty information;236
Verification of counterparty eligibility to enter into swaps and status
as a special entity (e.g., governmental body, retirement plan,
endowment);237
Counterparty disclosures, including pre-trade mid-market mark and
scenario analysis;238
Clearing related disclosure;239
Institutional suitability;240
Requirements applicable to swap dealers acting as advisors or
counterparties to special entities;241
One June 10, 2013, the second batch of entities became subject to clearing
requirement (these include all private funds and entities predominantly engaged in
activities that are financial in nature);242
On July 1, 2013, swap dealers had to begin portfolio reconciliation with their
counterparties;243
On September 9, 2013, all remaining entities became subject to clearing
requirement;244

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See id. § 23.503.
See id. §§ 39, 50.
See id. § 3.3.
See id. § 23.402.
See id. § 23.410(c).
See id. §§ 23.401, 23.430.
See id. § 23.431(a)–(c).
See id. § 23.432.
See id. § 23.434(a)(2), (b), (c).
See id. §§ 23.440, 23.450.
See id. §§ 39, 50.
See id. § 23.502.
See id. §§ 39, 50.
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On February 15, 2014, the first set of interest rate and credit default swaps
became subject to the platform execution requirement.245
On September 1, 2016, the variation margin requirement came into effect for
swap dealers with the largest outstanding notional amounts of uncleared swaps;246
On March 1, 2017, the rest of the swap dealers became subject to variation
margin requirements (although this was separately delayed until Sept. 1, 2017 under
CFTC Letter No. 17-11).247

245.
246.
247.

See Swaps Made Available to Trade, supra note 215.
See 17 C.F.R. § 23.153.
See id.
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